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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent commentary regarding the forward-looking statement safe harbor created by the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA” or “Reform Act”) 2 has focused on
the controversy sparked by Asher v. Baxter International, Inc.,3 a 2004 case in which the Seventh 
Circuit reversed the dismissal of a complaint alleging fraudulent projections after finding that the 
availability of the safe harbor could not be determined without discovery.4  Unfortunately, this 
debate over the stage of litigation at which courts ought to apply the PSLRA safe harbor 
provisions may obscure more fundamental issues left unsettled by the Reform Act regarding the 
appropriate substantive limits of liability for inaccurate predictions.
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 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771, 77z-1, 77z-2, 78a, 78j-1, 78t, 
78u, 78u-4, 78u-5 (Supp. I 1995).  The PSLRA made a host of other modifications to the federal private securities 
litigation system, including heightened pleading standards for allegations of securities fraud and changes to the 
procedures for appointing lead plaintiffs in securities class action suits.  The safe harbor provisions are codified at 15 
U.S.C. §77z-2 (Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”) and 15 U.S.C. §78u-5 (Section 21E of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”)).  The PSLRA defines “forward-looking statement” as: 
(A) a statement containing a projection of revenues, income (including income loss), earnings (including 
earnings loss) per share, capital expenditures, dividends, capital structure, or other financial items; (B) a statement of 
the plans and objectives of management for future operations, including plans or objectives relating to the products 
or services of the issuer; (C) a statement of future economic performance, including any such statement contained in 
a discussion and analysis of financial condition by the management or in the results of operations included pursuant 
to the rules and regulations of the Commission; (D) any statement of the assumptions underlying or relating to any 
statement described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C); (E) any report issued by an outside reviewer retained by an 
issuer, to the extent that the report assesses a forward-looking statement made by the issuer; or (F) a statement 
containing a projection or estimate of such other items as may be specified by rule or regulation of the Commission.
3
 377 F.3d 727 (7th Cir. 2004).
4 See, e.g., Joseph De Simone, et al., Asher to Asher and Dust to Dust: The Demise of the PSLRA Safe 
Harbor?, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS.,  Sum. 2005 at 799; Sarah S. Gold, et al., The Not-So-Safe Harbor, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 
13, 2004, at 3; Allan Horwich, Is There A Breach In The Breakwater Of The Statutory Safe Harbor For Forward-
Looking Statements?, Sept. 2004, available at http://www.wallstreetlawyer.com; O’Melveny & Myers LLP, Seventh 
Circuit Limits Applicability of PSLRA Safe Harbor For Forward-Looking Statements, Aug. 6, 2004, available at 
http://www.omm. com; and Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, Headline News: Legal 
Opinion Letter, “High Court Should Review Ruling On Securities Fraud ‘Safe Harbor,’” Dec. 3, 2004, available at 
http://www.securities.stanford.edu.
2The stated policy objective of the PSLRA safe harbor was “to enhance market efficiency 
by encouraging companies to disclose forward-looking information.”5  Most studies of corporate 
disclosure conducted following the Act’s passage, however, found no meaningful increase from 
pre-Act levels in the disclosure of forward-looking information.6  Among other reasons for 
managers’ reluctance to disclose more forward-looking information, observers cited ambiguities
in the language of the safe harbor’s provisions,7 including, most importantly, its first provision, 
which protects an issuer from liability for an inaccurate forward-looking statement if the 
statement “is accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements identifying important factors 
that could cause actual results to differ materially from those [predicted].”8 Nevertheless, 
because this provision was widely viewed as codifying the “bespeaks caution” doctrine, many
commentators suggested that the courts would soon resolve the provision’s ambiguities by 
5 H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369, at 43 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 741.
6 See, e.g., SEC Office of Gen. Counsel, Report to the President and the Congress on the First Year of 
Practice Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, at 3 (1997) (“[B]ased on discussions with the 
issuer community and review of filings with the Commission, the staff believes that the quality and quantity of 
forward-looking disclosure has not significantly improved following enactment of the safe harbor for forward-
looking statements. So far, it appears that companies have been reluctant to provide significantly more forward-
looking disclosure than they provided prior to enactment of the safe harbor.”); Current Issues and Rulemaking 
Projects, § X.B.3, SEC Div of Corp. Fin. (Aug. 17, 1998) (“For the most part, there has not been a noticeable 
increase in the amount of forward-looking information being provided.”); Committee on Securities Regulation, 
Forward-Looking Statements and Cautionary Language After the 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: A 
Study of Current Practices, 53 Record Assoc. Bar City of N.Y. 723, 736 (1998) (reporting study finding “no 
meaningful change in the nature or extent of written forward-looking statements made by reporting companies as a 
result of the adoption of the Act”); David M. Levine & Adam C. Pritchard, The Securities Litigation Uniform 
Standards Act of 1998: The Sun Sets on California’s Blue Sky Laws, 54 BUS. L.J. 1, 46 (1998) (reporting that data 
collected suggests no more than a modest increase in the disclosure of forward-looking information rather than the 
anticipated “significant post-Act increase in both the frequency of firms issuing forecasts and the mean number of 
forecasts issued”).  Apparently, only one study has reached the opposite conclusion.  See Marilyn F. Johnson et al., 
The Impact of Securities Litigation Reform on the Disclosure of Forward-Looking Information by High Technology 
Firms, 39 J. Acct. Res. 297 (2001).
7 See e.g., SEC Office of Gen. Counsel, Report to the President and the Congress on the First Year of 
Practice Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, at 5 (1997) (identifying concern about “lack of 
judicial guidance as to the sufficiency of the required ‘meaningful’ cautionary language” as a primary cause of 
issuer reluctance to provide more forward-looking information).
8
 15 U.S.C. §78u-5(c)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. I 1995).  The second provision of the safe harbor immunizes the 
statement if it is “immaterial” and the third if the speaker who made the forward-looking statement did not have 
“actual knowledge” that the statement was false or misleading.  Id. at §78u-5(c)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. I 1995).
3holding that its language was short-hand for this doctrine’s purportedly well-developed 
principles.9
Nearly ten years have passed since commentators made these hopeful assessments of the 
judiciary’s capacity to fine tune the PSLRA safe harbor provisions, but courts are no closer now 
to a uniform approach to evaluating liability for inaccurate predictions than they were in 1997
when the first cases implicating the safe harbor were filed.  Instead, it is rare that one can easily 
discern the substantive criteria applied by the court within a given safe harbor opinion let alone 
trends in the case law toward one particular approach to or another.  Left without intelligible 
judicial guidance, issuers tend to include long lists of unenlightening cautionary statements and 
risk factors in Commission filings and press releases containing predictive information, 
apparently believing that the longer the list, the greater the likelihood that a court, regardless of 
the criteria it applies, will find something in the list “meaningful.”
This article argues that two characteristics of the pre-PSLRA development of regulatory 
and judicial approaches to forward-looking information are primarily responsible for the
continuing confusion in this area of the law.  The first is a sharp, but heretofore unacknowledged, 
doctrinal shift in early 1990s marked by In Re Donald J. Trump Casino Securities Litigation, a 
9 See e.g., Regulation of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Forward-Looking Statements 
and Cautionary Language After the 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: A Study of Current Practices 
(August 1998) (“The former concern [regarding the absence of judicial guidance as to what constitutes ‘meaningful’ 
cautionary language] may well be overstated; the intent of the statute in this area was largely to codify the ‘bespeaks 
caution’ doctrine, which has been adopted in principle by every circuit to consider it . . . .”), reprinted in 1084 
PLI/Corp 795, 802 (1998); Richard A. Rosen, The Statutory safe harbor for Forward-Looking Statements after Two 
and a Half Years: Has it Changed the Law? Has it Achieved What Congress Intended?, 76 WASH. U.L.Q. 645, Sum. 
1998 at 653 (“Although the statute does not define ‘meaningful cautionary statements,’ an abundance of case law 
exists on this issue. . . .  It should be evident, then, that in interpreting and applying [the first provision of the safe 
harbor], the key feature of pre-Act case law relevant to understanding and predicting how the safe harbor will be 
applied is the ‘bespeaks caution’ doctrine, which has been adopted in principle by every circuit to consider it . . . .”); 
and Ann M. Olazabal, Safe Harbor For Forward-Looking Statements Under the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995: What’s Safe and What’s Not?, 105 DICK. L. REV. 1, Fall 2000, at 12 (“[W]e are not completely 
without guidance as to how protected forward-looking statements will be treated by the courts.  This is true because 
long before the Reform Act was enacted, there was already an expansive body of judge-made law holding that 
plaintiffs could not base securities fraud claims on forward-looking statements if such statements were accompanied 
by language that ‘bespeaks caution’ as to reliance thereupon.”).
41993 case in which the Third Circuit held that appropriately tailored accompanying statements 
render a projection immaterial.10  The second is the pre-1993 proliferation of imprecise 
vocabularies that refer to a single set of concepts of liability but fail to adequately elucidate the 
judicial inquiries entailed by these concepts.  The article further demonstrates that either the SEC 
or the Supreme Court could take advantage of the flexible language of the PSLRA safe harbor 
and eliminate both of these sources of confusion by steering the lower courts into a single, 
clearly articulated framework for assessing liability for inaccurate forward-looking statements.
Part II lays the foundation for these arguments by demonstrating that, with rare 
exceptions, all regulatory and judicial approaches to forward-looking information employed 
from the passage of the federal securities acts through the early 1990s (including the pre-1993
bespeaks caution doctrine) conformed to a single doctrinal framework.  The framework’s 
underlying assumption is that disclosures of forward-looking information tend to significantly 
influence investor behavior or, in other words, that such information is generally material.  
Accordingly, the framework’s primary inquiry is whether the forward-looking information in 
question was false or misleading.11  This determination is made by evaluating whether a 
“reasonable” investor would have drawn from the publication of the information the incorrect 
inferences that allegedly misled the plaintiff.  To the extent a reasonable investor would have 
drawn those inferences they constitute implied misrepresentations, actionable under the securities 
laws unless, due to exceptional circumstances, they would not have significantly influenced a 
10
 7 F.3d 357 (3d Cir. 1993).
11
 The elements of falsity and materiality together establish an initial threshold of proof that a plaintiff must 
meet for recovery under any of the federal securities antifraud provisions.  To recover under SEC Rule 10b-5, a 
plaintiff must also prove scienter, reliance, and causation. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2001); Twiss v. Kury, 25 F.3d 
1551, 1558 (11th Cir. 1994).  Rule 10b-5’s scienter requirement distinguishes it from the antifraud rules of the 
Securities Act, under which a plaintiff may recover by proving lesser degrees of culpability.  Under §11 of the 
Securities Act, for example, an issuer is strictly liable for material misstatements or omissions in a registration 
statement and other participants in the offering may be jointly liable to the extent they failed undertake a reasonable 
investigation of the truthfulness of the misstatements. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (Supp. I 1995).
5reasonable investor’s decision-making process.  Part II demonstrates that t he often dramatic 
changes in regulatory policy from the mid-1930s to the early 1990s, as well as the 
inconsistencies in cases involving forward-looking information decided during this time period, 
generally reflect evolving conceptions of the reasonable investor rather than departures from this 
basic doctrinal framework.
To be sure, the opinions in pre-1993 cases involving forward-looking information 
generally, and the bespeaks caution opinions in particular, leave much to be desired in terms of 
rhetorical precision and, in many cases, suggest that the judges who wrote the opinions failed to 
fully grasp the traditional framework’s structure.  For example, language in some of the circuit 
court bespeaks caution opinions appears to establish a per se rule against liability for a failed
projection accompanied by cautionary statements.  Nevertheless, the underlying basis for all of 
these courts’ decisions was an intuitive judgment, however poorly articulated, that the 
disclosures accompanying the projection or other factors made the incorrect inferences the 
plaintiff allegedly drew from the disclosure of the projection unreasonable and that the disclosure 
therefore would not have misled a reasonable investor regarding the probability of the projected 
outcome.
Part III explains how the Third Circuit, in its opinion in Trump, was able to successfully 
redirect the course of forward-looking statement analysis by exploiting the ambiguities in the 
earlier bespeaks caution opinions and misreading Supreme Court precedent.  In 1991, the 
Supreme Court, in Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, applied the traditional framework in a 
manner that should have ensured its application in future lower court cases involving allegedly 
misleading forward-looking information.12 In its Trump opinion issued two years later, the Third 
12
 501 U.S. 1083 (1991).
6Circuit transformed the bespeaks caution doctrine into a single-factor materiality test and 
asserted that its “analysis comport[ed] with the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Virginia 
Bankshares.”  As Part III demonstrates, however, it is impossible to reconcile the Trump
materiality analysis with the doctrinal framework endorsed in Virginia Bankshares.  
Nevertheless, because courts and commentators failed to recognize that the Third Circuit’s 
analysis represented a sharp departure from the previous line of “bespeaks caution” cases, lower 
courts in subsequent cases generally took as granted that the “bespeaks caution” doctrine was, as 
the Third Circuit had held, a materiality-based approach to assessing the actionability of 
inaccurate forward-looking information.  Against this background of unwitting judicial 
acquiescence to the Third Circuit’s reformulation of the bespeaks caution doctrine, congressional 
negotiations over private securities litigation reform ultimately produced the PSLRA in 1995.  
As a result, since the PSLRA’s enactment, courts and commentators have often taken as granted 
that the first provision of the Act’s safe harbor “codifies the materiality standard set forth in 
[Trump] and reiterated in numerous other circuits, and makes that standard uniform 
nationwide.”13
13
 Richard A. Rosen, The Statutory safe harbor for Forward-Looking Statements after Two and a Half 
Years: Has it Changed the Law? Has it Achieved What Congress Intended?, 76 WASH. U.L.Q. 645, Sum. 1998 at 
653.  See also Ann M. Olazabal, Safe Harbor For Forward-Looking Statements Under the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995: What’s Safe and What’s Not?, 105 DICK. L. REV. 1, Fall 2000, at 12 (“The statutory 
language itself and the legislative history of the Act seem to indicate that the safe harbor . . . is based entirely on a 
materiality analysis.  In other words, as to the first two prongs of the statute, forward-looking statements are 
neutralized – or rendered immaterial – by sufficient cautionary language, or they are found to be immaterial on other 
grounds”); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Or, Why the Fat Lady 
Has Not Yet Sung, 51 BUS. LAW. 975, 990 (1996) (“This proposed interpretation that a ‘meaningful cautionary 
statement’ is one that sufficiently corrects or mitigates the false statement so as to render it either immaterial or 
‘non-reliable’ is consistent with the ‘bespeaks caution’ doctrine, which the safe harbor was originally intended to 
codify.”); Eric Talley, Diclosure Norms, 149 U.PA.L.REV. 1955, 1979 (2001) (“Finally, it is worth noting that the 
cautionary language prong of the statutory safe harbor also retains the pre-1995 conception of ‘materiality.’  As 
before, satisfactory cautionary language will essentially have the effect of rendering the disclosure immaterial as a 
matter of law.”).
7Part IV argues that this view of the safe harbor is misguided for several reasons, not the 
least of which is its inconsistency with the provisions’ underlying logic. The link between the 
safe harbor’s policy objective (enhancing allocative efficiency) and its means (increasing the 
disclosure of forward-looking information) disappears if one discards the premise that investor 
behavior will be influenced by the disclosures induced by the safe harbor.14  Put another way, if 
to satisfy the first provision’s test for meaningfulness, accompanying statements must render a 
forward-looking statement immaterial, then most forward-looking statements that qualify for 
protection under that provision do not contain the kind of information Congress hoped issuers 
would disclose in greater quantities in response to the legislation.  A statutory interpretation that 
produces such a stark disconnect between the statute’s operation and its policy objectives must 
exhibit other compelling virtues or be discarded.  Part IV demonstrates, however, that the 
materiality-based interpretation continues to fare poorly when measured against other important 
criteria.  Fortunately, the language of the safe harbor permits a falsity-based interpretation of the 
first safe harbor provision and, if properly grounded in the traditional doctrinal framework , this 
interpretation resolves the defects to which the materiality-based interpretation is subject.  Part 
IV concludes with a brief discussion of the key benefits well-crafted SEC or Supreme Court 
interpretive intervention with respect to the PSLRA safe harbor provisions could yield.
II. PRE-PSLRA REGULATORY AND JUDICIAL APPLICATIONS OF THE TRADITIONAL 
DOCTRINAL FRAMEWORK
A.   The Evolution of the SEC’s Conception of the Reasonable Investor
From the creation of the SEC in 1934 through the early 1970s, the Commission 
continuously discouraged public disclosure of forward-looking information and maintained that 
14
 Allocative efficiency, the allocation of capital to its best use, requires securities prices that reflect 
available information regarding companies’ business prospects.  Accordingly, an increase in forward-looking 
information disclosures enhances allocative efficiency only to the extent that the disclosures influence the investor 
decisions that determine security prices.
8the disclosure of business projections in SEC filings was per se misleading.  Although not 
immediately apparent, this policy was rooted in the doctrinal framework described in Part I.  As 
a result, statements by courts and commentators from this era regarding the Commission’s policy 
frequently reflect the framework’s basic contours.  For example, in 1961, former senior SEC 
staffer Harry Heller, describing the justification for the Commission’s policy and decisions by 
courts in line with that policy, stated:  “[A]ttempts by companies to predict future earnings on 
their own or on the authority of experts have almost invariably been held to be misleading 
because they suggest to the investor a competence and authority which in fact does not exist.”15
Similarly, in the 1964 case of Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Chicago and Northwestern Railway 
Co.,16 the court noted that the publication of predictions leads investors to “readily to assume, 
contrary to fact, that the predictor has special knowledge or unique information to bear out fully 
his prediction, and be induced to rely upon a supposed expert judgment of the mysteries of 
finance.”17  The court then found the predictions at issue misleading because they “convey[ed] a 
certitude which inherently they [could not] possess.”18  As discussed in Part I, the evaluation of 
such unstated propositions (reflected by Heller’s emphasis on what the publication of a 
prediction “suggest[s] to the investor” and Northwestern’s discussion regarding facts a prediction 
causes investors to “readily to assume”) is the traditional doctrinal framework's central analysis.
15
 Harry Heller, Disclosure Requirements Under Federal Securities Regulation, 16 BUS. LAW. 300, 307 
(1961).  See also Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure, report to the Securities and Exchange Commission 
305 (Comm. Print 95-29 1977) (hereinafter “Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure”).  The perception that 
projections were exceptionally “susceptible to improper manipulation by unscrupulous corporate managers” lent 
additional support to the Commission’s position. Id. at A-268.  
16
 226 F. Supp. 400 (N.D. Ill. 1964).  Union Pacific and Northwestern were corporate bidders competing to 
buy the same company.  Union Pacific sought an injunction to prevent the target company’s shareholders from 
approving Northwestern’s offer based on its allegation that a report Northwestern had sent to those shareholders 
contained misleading predictions in violation of Rule 14a-9.  Id.
17 Id. at 409.
18 Id.
9In addition to demonstrating the consistency of the SEC’s policy with the traditional 
framework, the statement by Heller reflects the paternalistic conception of the average investor 
that prevailed at the Commission for the first several decades of its existence.19 Throughout this 
time period, protecting investors from their own errors of judgment was one of the 
Commission’s primary objectives.  In the 1960s and 1970s, however, new insights regarding the 
operation of markets and investor behavior called the Commission’s focus on protecting the 
unsophisticated into question.  In 1967, the SEC formed an internal study group led by 
Commissioner Francis M. Wheat to examine the securities laws’ corporate disclosure system.20
Reflecting the emerging view that investors are generally sophisticated enough to discount 
expected earnings in an effort to identify misvalued stocks, the Wheat Report acknowledged that 
“most investment decisions are based essentially on estimates of future earnings.”  Nevertheless, 
the Wheat report concluded that the “real danger . . . that projections appearing in [documents 
filed with the SEC] would be accorded a greater measure of validity by the unsophisticated than 
they would deserve” outweighed the benefits of permitting disclosure.21  Skepticism regarding 
the Commission’s traditional policy continued to mount, however, and just two years later the 
Commission held public hearings regarding potential changes to the policy.22
19
 The Northwestern court clearly shared this conception.  Only by conceiving of the average investor as 
markedly prone to errors of judgment could the Northwestern court conclude that average investors would assume a 
fact based on Northwestern’s predictions (the possession by management of information “bear[ing] out fully [its] 
prediction”) that the court easily recognized could “inherently” not be true.
20
 SEC Disclosure Study Proposed, Securities Act Release No. 33,4885, at 1 (Nov. 29, 1967).  The study 
group planned to focus primarily on the potential for further integration of the disclosure requirements of the 
Securities Act and Exchange Act.  Id.  As the study progressed, however, securities analysts encouraged the group to 
also reevaluate the Commission’s policy on projection disclosure.  Securities and Exchange Commission, Disclosure 
to Investors: A Reappraisal of Administrative Policies under the '33 and '34 Acts 94 (1969) (hereinafter “Wheat 
Report”).
21 Id. at 94-95.
22 See Commission Orders Public Proceeding in the Matter of Estimates, Forecasts or Projections of 
Economic Performance and Related Subjects, Exchange Act Release No. 34,9844 (Nov. 1, 1972).
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In early 1973, the Commission announced that as a result of the hearings it had 
determined that “changes in its present policies with regard to the use of projections would assist 
in the protection of investors and would be in the public interest.”23  Two years later, the 
Commission published proposed rules for implementing these changes.  The rules outlined an 
elaborate set of procedures for integrating projections into Commission filings and proposed an 
equally complex projection safe harbor.24  Demonstrating the ongoing pull of the Commission’s 
traditional conception of the average investor as unsophisticated, the proposed safe harbor,
among its many other requirements, required that a published projection be accompanied by a 
statement “cautioning that there can be no assurance that the projection will be achieved.”25
23
 Commission’s Findings on Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic Performance by Issuers of 
Publicly Traded Securities, Securities Act Release No. 33,5362 (March 19, 1973).  The announcement noted that the 
information the Commission gathered during the hearings simply “reinforced [the SEC’s] own observation that 
management’s assessment of a company’s future performance is information of significant importance to the 
investor.” Id. at 1.
24
 Notice of Proposed Rule 132, Securities Act Release No. 33,5581 (April 28, 1975). 
25
 The proposal would have required the accompanying statements to also “disclose the material 
assumptions underlying the projection” and that the projection be “prepared with reasonable care,” have a 
“reasonable factual basis,” and reflect management’s “good faith judgment.”  These and other “projection criteria” 
were added to various “issuer criteria” to fill out the full set of safe harbor requirements.  Id. at 10-16.  After 
proposing the “prepared with reasonable care,” “reasonable factual basis,” and “good faith judgment” standards as 
prerequisites to safe harbor protection, the Commission noted that “these criteria have generally been considered by 
courts as requirements concerning the preparation of publicly disclosed projections.” Id.  This statement was likely 
made in reference to Dolgow v. Andersen, 53 F.R.D. 664 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) and Beecher v. Able, 374 F. Supp. 341 
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), two leading district court cases from the Second Circuit.  The Beecher court held that “a 
reasonable prudent investor would conclude [from the disclosure of an internal projection] that it was highly 
probable that the forecast would be realized” and that publishing a projection less likely to be achieved was 
therefore misleading.  374 F. Supp. at 348.  The Doglow court, on the other hand, held that a defendant’s disclosure 
of an internal projection was not misleading so long as it was “the best estimate[] of the people in [the company] 
most qualified to make [it].” 53 F.R.D. at 676.  Thus, under the Doglow conception, a reasonable investor does not 
infer from the disclosure of a projection that the projected results are highly probable but only that they were the 
best projections that management could make under the circumstances.  In other words, under this view, 
reasonableness is not a quality of the projection itself but of the method used to produce the projection.  
Accordingly, so long as management uses the best information available and an accepted calculation procedure, the 
projection’s basis should be deemed reasonable even if the quality and/or completeness of the available information 
suggest a very low confidence level or a very high error rate.  This article uses the term confidence level to describe 
the likelihood that actual results will match a point projection or fall within a range of projected values.  The article 
uses the term error rate to describe how wide a range of projected values must be to achieve a satisfactorily high 
confidence level.  The 1973 release announcing the Commission’s intent to change its policy on projection 
disclosure suggests that the Commission favored the Beecher analysis over the Doglow analysis.  For example, the 
1973 release stated that permission to include projection in Commission filings should be limited to issuers “who are 
reporting companies and who meet certain standards relating to their earnings histories and budgeting experience.”  
11
In response to widespread objections to the complexity of the proposed safe harbor and 
projection disclosure requirements, the SEC tabled the proposals in April 1976 pending 
completion of a new study on disclosure by an advisory committee appointed by the Commission 
two months earlier.26  Referencing the “increasing body of scholarly work examining the 
economics and structure of information systems . . . [with] increasing consideration [being] given 
to the ‘random walk theory’ and the efficient market hypothesis,”27 the Commission had formed 
the advisory committee to undertake a comprehensive review of the securities laws’ corporate 
disclosure system and recommend changes to the Commission’s policies.28  According to the 
efficient market hypothesis, even the most savvy investors will be unable to consistently identify 
undervalued or overvalued securities because security prices in active markets continuously 
reflect the views of other market participants that, in the aggregate, take into account all 
available market information.  The flip side of the hypothesis is that even the most misguided 
participants in active markets will be unable to consistently make bad investment decisions.  By 
Commission’s Findings on Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic Performance by Issuers of Publicly Traded 
Securities, Securities Act Release No. 33,5362 (March 19, 1973) at 8.  The 1975 proposed safe harbor issuer criteria 
continued this emphasis on operating history through its requirement that issuers “have prepared budgets for internal 
use for its last three fiscal years” before disclosing projections in Commission filings.  Notice of Proposed Rule 132, 
Securities Act Release No. 33,5581 (April 28, 1975) at 13.
26
 Notice of Adoption of an Amendment to Rule 14a-9 and Withdrawal of the Other Proposals Contained in
Release No. 33-5581, Securities Act Release No. 33,5699 (April 23, 1976) at 3.  Nevertheless, the Commission 
noted that “[because] investors appear to want management’s assessment of a company’s future performance, and 
since some managements may wish to furnish their projections through Commission filings,” the SEC would no 
longer “object to the disclosure in filings with the Commission of projections which are made in good faith and have 
a reasonable basis, provided that they are . . . accompanied by information adequate for investors to make their own 
judgments.”  Id. at 4.  The Commission then proposed non-binding Division of Corporation Finance “Disclosure of 
Projections of Future Performance” guides under both the Securities Act and Exchange Act.26  The guides suggest 
that the Commission’s views regarding the meaning of the reasonable basis requirement and the adequacy of 
accompanying information had not changed. With respect to the reasonable basis requirement the release noted:  
“The [Division of Corporation Finance] believes that management should have the option to present in Commission 
filings its good faith assessment of a company’s future performance.  Management must, however, have a 
reasonable basis for such an assessment.  A history of operations or experience in projecting may be among the 
factors providing a basis for management’s assessment.” Id. at 7.  With regard to the importance of accompanying 
information the guides stated: “[T]he Division believes that investor understanding would be enhanced by disclosure 
of the assumptions which in management’s opinion are most significant to the projections or are the key factors 
upon which the financial results of the enterprise depend.” Id. at 11-12. 
27
 Securities Act Release No. 33,5673 at 3.
28 Id. See also Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure, supra note 15, at D-3.  
12
crediting this proposition, the advisory committee embraced a conception of the average or 
reasonable investor as sophisticated and, as a result, concerns about protecting unsophisticated 
investors carried little weight in the advisory committee’s deliberations.  In fact, unlike the 
previous debates regarding public disclosure of forward-looking information, debate among the 
advisory committee members focused not on the whether the Commission should allow
projections, but on whether it should require them as a means of enhancing pricing accuracy.29
In the end, the committee recommended that the Commission should only “encourage 
issuers to publish forward-looking . . . information” and proposed a simple issuer-friendly safe 
harbor rule as the primary means to achieve that goal.30  In contrast to the web of requirements
contained in the Commission’s safe harbor proposal, the advisory committee’s proposed rule 
required only that management have “a reasonable basis” for its projections and disclose the 
projections “in good faith.”31  In addition, although the committee observed that the disclosure of 
a projection’s assumptions “provides a framework for analysis of the projection,” it 
recommended that “to maximize the attractiveness of the program to registrants . . . the 
disclosure of assumptions should only be encouraged, rather than formally required.”32
In 1978, the Commission simultaneously published two releases in response to the 
advisory committee’s recommendations.  In the first release, the Commission proposed an 
29
 Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure, supra note 15, 347-357.
30
 The Committee’s report noted that its proposed disclosure program was designed to “permit[] wide 
latitude to companies issuing projections.”  Id. at 353.  In contrast to the Commission’s earlier proposal, the 
Committee recommended that “all public companies should be eligible to [disclose internal projections]” regardless 
of the extent of their operating history or previous budgeting experience because, in the Committee’s view, there 
was no evidence to “‘suggest that the “size” of the company has anything to do with the reliability of its 
projections’” or to “‘suggest that a company with established earnings is better able to project than a company 
without established earnings. . . .’” Id. at 356 (quoting James Merrifield, Projections in SEC Filings: The Debate 
Rages over Worth, SEC 149, 166-167 (1974) 
31 Id. at 364.  The committee omitted the requirement that published predictions be accompanied by a 
statement “cautioning that there can be no assurance that the projection will be achieved,” presumably because it 
believed that efficient pricing of securities would protect unsophisticated investors from the consequences of the 
erroneous inference that predicted results were guaranteed.
32 Id.
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alternative safe harbor rule that used the committee’s “reasonable basis” and “good faith” 
terminology but omitted several issuer-friendly components of the committee’s proposal.33
While the proposed rule did not explicitly require assumption disclosure as the Commission’s 
earlier proposal had, in a companion release the Commission suggested that failure to disclose 
assumptions could render projections misleading:
[U]nder certain circumstances the disclosure of underlying assumptions may be 
material to an understanding of the projected results:  For example, where 
projected results are based to a significant degree upon the introduction of a new 
product or service meeting certain anticipated levels of sales and contribution to 
earnings, disclosure of the projection without this information might be 
misleading.34
This discussion reflects a nuanced conception of the reasonable investor, under which the 
reasonable investor avoids inferring from the publication of a projection unaccompanied by 
disclosure of underlying assumptions that projected results are guaranteed but is entitled to infer 
that the unexplained estimate has, by some standard, a typical confidence level or error rate.35  In 
other words, where there are factors that give rise to an unusually low confidence level or high 
33 See Proposed Safe Harbor Rule For Projections, Securities Act Release No. 33,5993 (Nov. 7, 1978).  The 
Commission’s proposed safe harbor would have covered only projections made by public companies and placed the 
burden of proof on the defendant to show that the projection had a reasonable basis and was disclosed in good faith.
See id. at 5-7. With respect to the burden of proof, the Release noted that: “The Commission is proposing the rule in 
this manner since it is concerned that the burden imposed on a plaintiff -- including the Commission -- could be 
insurmountable.  It would be extremely difficult to prove the absence of a reasonable basis or good faith, especially 
as to plaintiffs who would not have the Commission’s investigatory procedures available and cannot engage in 
discovery prior to the filing of a complaint alleging a violation.” Id.  In the end, however, the Commission reversed 
its position based on criticism that placing the burden of proof on defendants “would deter companies from making 
projections, thereby negating the Commission’s objective” and “would in all likelihood increase the institution of 
frivolous, nuisance litigation based solely on the failure of the results to match projections.” Safe Harbor Rule For 
Projections, Securities Act Release No. 33,6084 (June 25, 1979) at 3.  The Commission also slightly expanded the 
coverage of the safe harbor beyond projections made by public companies by making the safe harbor applicable to 
forward-looking statements contained in registrations statements relating to initial public offerings.  Due in part to 
its “continuing concern regarding the selective disclosure of forward-looking information,” however, the 
Commission ultimately determined that “[s]tatements made outside of [Commission filings would] be covered by 
the rule only if they [were also] included in documents filed with the Commission.” Id. at 7.  The final rules were 
adopted as Rule 3b(6) under the Exchange Act and Rule 175 under the Securities Act. 12 C.F.R. § 563d.3b-6 (2001).  
The the two rules are identical with the exception of their references to the Acts under which they were adopted.
34
 Guides for Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic Performance, Securities Act Release No. 
33,5992 (Nov. 7, 1978) at 16.
35 See supra note 25 for a description of the terms “confidence level” and “error rate.”
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error rate, those factors must be disclosed to prevent the projection from misleading the 
reasonable investor.
Apparently in an effort to persuade courts to this view, the Commission affirmed in its 
final release announcing its adoption of the safe harbor that “the key assumptions underlying a 
forward-looking statement are of such significance that their disclosure may [] be necessary in 
order for such statements to meet the reasonable basis and good faith standards embodied in the 
rule.” 36  The success of this effort was not tested until more than a decade later in the Seventh 
Circuit case of Weiglos v. Commonwealth Edison.37 Weiglos involved cost estimates that proved 
36
 Safe Harbor Rule For Projections, Securities Act Release No. 33,6084 (June 25, 1979) at 6.
37
 892 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1989).  Weiglos is apparently the only reported circuit court case to address 
whether Rule 175 requires assumption disclosure.  The limited case law on this issue, however, is not surprising 
because, as a consequence of the Commission’s decision to restrict the coverage of the rule to statements included in 
Commission filings, Rule 175 was implicated in only a fraction of the subsequent cases involving forward-looking 
information.  Nevertheless, during the 1980s and 1990s, the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, D.C. and Eighth 
Circuits all applied variations of the Rule 175 test to evaluate the falsity of projections not included in Commission 
filings.  See Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 776 (3d. Cir. 1985) (“[A]n opinion that has been issued without a 
genuine belief or reasonable basis is an ‘untrue’ statement….”); Isquith v. Middle South Utilities, Inc. 847 F.2d 186, 
203-204 (5th Cir. 1988) (“Most often, whether liability is imposed depends on whether the predictive statement was 
‘false’ when it was made.  The answer to this inquiry, however, does not turn on whether the prediction in fact 
proved to be wrong; instead, falsity is determined by examining the nature of the prediction--with the emphasis on 
whether the prediction suggested reliability, bespoke caution, was made in good faith, or had a sound factual or 
historical basis.”); Rubinstein v. Collins  20 F.3d 160, 166 (5th Cir. 1994) (“In sum, a predictive statement is one 
that contains at least three factual assertions that may be actionable: 1) The speaker genuinely believes the statement 
is accurate; 2) there is a reasonable basis for that belief; and 3) the speaker is unaware of any undisclosed facts that 
would tend seriously to undermine the accuracy of the statement.”); Kowal v. MCI Communications Corp. 16 F.3d 
1271, 1277 (DC Cir. 1994) (“[P]rojections and statements of optimism are false and misleading for the purposes of 
the securities laws if they were issued without good faith or lacked a reasonable basis when made.”);  Eckstein v. 
Balcor Film Investors, 8 F.3d 1121, 1132 (7th Cir. 1993) (“[P]redictions that don’t pan out can lead to Rule 10b-5 
liability only if the prediction was unreasonable in light of the information available at the time the statement was 
made.”);  Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., Inc.  51 F.3d 1329, 1333 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[A] projection can lead to 
liability under Rule 10b-5 only if it was not made in good faith or was made without a reasonable basis.”); Exeter 
Bancorporation, Inc. v. Kemper Securities Group, Inc. 58 F.3d 1306, 1113 (8th Cir., 1995) (“That the [expected 
outcome] eventually did not materialize is not, by itself, enough to create an inference that the statement was false 
when made; other evidence is required to show that [the defendant] did not believe, or lacked reason to believe, [the 
basis for the prediction] at the time it made the statement. Fraud is not shown simply because an expected 
occurrence did not occur.”); Sinay v. Lamson & Sessions Co. 948 F.2d 1037, 1040 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing Isquith v. 
Middle South Utils., Inc., 847 F.2d 186, 204 (5th Cir.)) (“In determining whether the statements are actionable, the 
court must scrutinize the nature of the statement to determine whether the statement was false when made. While 
analyzing the nature of the statement, the court must emphasize whether the ‘prediction suggested reliability, 
bespoke caution, was made in good faith, or had a sound factual or historical basis.’”); and San Leandro Emergency 
Medical Group Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc. 75 F.3d 801, 813 (2nd Cir. 1996) (“Finally, 
with respect to the company’s forward-looking statements, plaintiffs have not alleged circumstances to show that the 
defendants lacked a reasonable basis for their optimistic, but qualified, predictions as to the company’s future 
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inaccurate.  In an opinion written by Judge Easterbrook, the court considered whether the 
defendant’s estimates failed to meet Rule 175’s reasonable basis test because the accompanying 
disclosures “did not assist anyone in estimating how likely (and how great) a departure from its 
point estimates would be.”38  In the court’s view, this failure alone was not enough to push 
inaccurate predictions out of the Rule 175 safe harbor.  According to Judge Easterbrook, 
requiring “issuer[s] to reveal all of the data, assumptions, and methodology behind [their] 
projections, so that participants in the market could assess them fully and react appropriately” 
could make the safe harbor “impossible to enter” because the disclosure of such information 
would frequently impair the companies’ competitive position.39  Thus, the reasonable investor, 
understanding a company’s need to safeguard proprietary information, both “infers from what is 
said and what is omitted how reliable the estimate is”40 or, in other words, does not automatically 
infer an industry-typical confidence level or error rate from the absence of assumption 
disclosures.
Although the conclusions of the Seventh Circuit in Weiglos and the Commission of the 
late 1970s with respect to assumption disclosure are at odds, their approaches can be easily 
reconciled by blending their alternative conceptions of the reasonable investor.  Under this 
performance.”).  Most of these decisions do not provide significant insight into the relevance of accompanying 
disclosures to the evaluation of whether a projection was made in good faith or had a reasonable basis.  Still, the use 
of these and similar terms in the opinions reflects the decisions’ conformity to the traditional doctrinal framework in 
the same way that the Commission’s use of the good faith/reasonable basis language in its rule-making deliberations 
reflects the Commission’s conformity to the traditional doctrinal framework during its 1970s rulemaking process 
that produced Rule 175.  To say that a projection must be made in good faith is simply to say that investors are 
entitled to infer that management does not know of undisclosed information that discredits the projection.  Similarly, 
to say that a projection must have a reasonable basis is simply to say that investors are entitled to draw certain 
inferences about facts underlying a published prediction in order to make judgments about the subject matter of the 
prediction or, in other words, regarding its confidence level/error rate.  Whether an investor was entitled to draw a 
particular incorrect inference about the subject matter of the published prediction is determined by the conception of 
the reasonable investor that a judge or jury combines with this general proposition.
38
 892 F.2d 509, 514 (7th Cir. 1989).
39 Id.
40 Id. at 515.
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blended conception, the reasonable investor does not expect companies to reveal a projection’s 
underlying assumptions if such disclosures would materially compromise the company’s 
competitive position; the reasonable investor may assume, however, that if there are known 
factors that are likely to cause a significant departure from a projected results and disclosure of 
those factors would not pose a material risk to the company’s business, any cautionary 
statements accompanying the projection will disclose those factors.
B. The Development of the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine: A New Label for the Concepts of the 
Traditional Doctrinal Framework
The Eighth Circuit coined the “bespeaks caution” phrase one year before the adoption of 
Rule 175 in Polin v. Conductron.41  Both Polin and the Second Circuit’s much more widely cited 
“bespeaks caution” decision eight years later in Luce v. Edlelstein42 held only that the boilerplate 
warnings accompanying projections prevent reasonable investors from drawing the inference that 
the predicted results are guaranteed.  As noted above, the SEC accepted this unremarkable 
proposition in the early 1970s and by the end of that decade had apparently concluded that 
reasonable investors generally do not infer from the publication of a forecast that the predicted 
results are guaranteed even if the publication fails to warn against drawing that inference.  The 
first circuit court opinions to use the “bespeaks caution” language as short-hand for their 
conclusions that disclosures accompanying predictions rendered unreasonable investors’ 
inferences regarding the predictions’ error rate or confidence level did not appear until 1991.  
This section demonstrates that all of these pre-1993 circuit court decisions were rooted in th e 
traditional framework for assessing the actionability of inaccurate predictions, notwithstanding 
language in several of the opinions that appears to reflect a more formulaic approach.
41
 552 F.2d 797 (1977).
42
 802 F.2d 49 (1986).
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1. Preventing the Mistaken Inference that Forecasted Results are Guaranteed
Polin involved loss estimates on the sale of aircraft cockpit simulators.43  The 
manufacturer of the simulators allocated its research and development costs to the simulators on 
a proportional basis.44  When the manufacturer learned that revenues from the sale of some of the 
simulators would be inadequate to recover the costs allocated to their production, it began 
disclosing loss estimates in its annual reports.45  The plaintiffs alleged that (1) the manufacturer 
intentionally understated these estimates and (2) statements in the manufacturer’s annual report 
that “results for 1968 were ‘expected’ to show improvement” and that it “saw a ‘possibility’ of a 
break-even soon” were false.46  Observing that “[t]he terms . . . employed bespeak caution in 
outlook” and “recognize the imponderable influences of complex variables in a fast-changing 
field,” the court held the manufacturer’s statements fell “far short of the assurances required for a 
finding of falsity and fraud.”47  Stated otherwise, the court’s “bespeaks caution” holding was 
simply that the use of language to present a projection that “recognizes” the inherent uncertainty 
of its future results requires investors to recognize that uncertainty as well rather than taking the 
statements as an “assurance” of the predicted outcomes.  The court’s observation thus mirrors the 
conclusion implicit in the SEC’s early 1970s releases that the accompaniment of a projection 
with a statement cautioning against the inference that the results predicted are guaranteed is 
sufficient to prevent a reasonable investor from drawing that inference.48
43
 552 F.2d 797 (1977).
44 Id. at 801.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 802.
47 Id. at 807.
48
 By itself, the court’s “bespeaks caution” statement could easily be read to suggest that a projection 
cannot be false or fraudulent unless it is stated as an assurance of future outcomes.  It is unlikely, however, that the 
Eighth Circuit intended to endorse this proposition.  The loss estimates were also not stated as assurances and the 
court did not base its conclusion that those estimates were not fraudulent on that fact.  Instead, it relied on the district 
court finding that there was “no substantial basis for the contention that any of the reports withheld material 
information or fraudulently minimized losses which should have been anticipated.” 552 F.2d at 807.  Presumably, 
18
After Polin, nearly a decade passed before the Second Circuit used the Eighth Circuit’s 
“bespeaks caution” terminology to describe its own holding in Luce v. Edelstein49 that cautionary 
language could immunize inaccurate projections.50  In Luce, the plaintiffs were investors in a 
partnership created to construct and sell condominium units.  Their complaint alleged multiple 
violations of Rule 10b-5 including that the offering memorandum “contained intentional 
misrepresentations as to the potential cash and tax benefits of the partnership.”51  The district 
court found that none of the plaintiffs’ allegations had been pleaded with the level of 
particularity required by Rule 9(b) and dismissed the complaint on that basis.52
On appeal, the Second Circuit read the investors’ allegation regarding the cash and tax 
benefits to assert that the offering memorandum implicitly guaranteed that the projected tax and 
cash benefits would be realized.53  The Court then held that this allegation did not state a 10(b) 
claim because:
then, had the plaintiffs been able to show that the manufacturer had withheld information suggesting that there was 
no “‘possibility’ of a break-even,” its use of language that “recognize[d] the imponderable influences of complex 
variables in a fast-changing field” would not have insulated the break-even projection from liability.
49
 802 F.2d at 51.  Luce, rather than Polin, is seen as the progenitor of the bespeaks caution doctrine. See 
e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Disclosures that “Bespeak Caution”, 49 BUS. LAW., Feb. 1994, at 481, 481.
50
 During this time period, more than thirty published circuit and district court opinions cited other parts of 
the Polin opinion.  Polin’s “bespeaks caution” statements, however, were first cited in the Second Circuit’s 1985 
decision in Goldman vs. Belden 754 F.2d 1059 (1985), three years before the Second Circuit again cited this 
language in Luce.  Unlike the Luce court, the Goldman court found that the plaintiff’s complaint (which alleged 
“that defendants made a series of very positive predictions without qualifications . . . while they . . . knew of many 
flaws in [their principal product]”) stated a valid 10b-5 claim even though the court determined that the predictions 
were not “quite as unqualified as the [c]omplaint alleged.” Id. at 1065.
51
 802 F.2d at 56. The complaint also alleged that the offering memorandum represented that the general 
partners would take certain actions that they never intended to take and that the defendants mismanaged partnership 
property. Id. at 55-56.
52 Id. at 53. The district court also suggested that even if the allegations had satisfied Rule 9(b) the court 
would have still dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim because, in its view, “most of the activities 
alleged [were] not even colorably within the purview of §10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5.” Id. at 55.  Accordingly, the 
district court did not grant the plaintiffs leave to amend the complaint. Id. at 53.
53
 This reading of the complaint by the court was primarily based on the complaint’s allegations that the 
“defendants made oral and written representations to plaintiffs and the class regarding their returns on investment 
and cash and tax benefits apart from the offering memorandum.” Id. at 54 (emphasis added).  In light of these 
allegations, the court took the complaint’s discussion of “intentional misrepresentation” regarding these cash and tax 
benefits in the offering memorandum to allege that the offering memorandum served to confirm the oral and written 
assurances.
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the Offering Memorandum made it quite clear that its projections of potential cash 
and tax benefits were “necessarily speculative in nature” and that “[n]o assurance 
[could] be given that these projections [would] be realized.” Indeed, the Offering 
Memorandum warned prospective investors that “[a]ctual results may vary from 
the predictions and these variations may be material.” We are not inclined to 
impose liability on the basis of statements that clearly “bespeak caution.”54
Thus, as in Polin, the Luce bespeaks caution holding was simply a restatement of the SEC’s 
position that generic warnings are sufficient to prevent the inference that the projected results are 
guaranteed.55
Thus understood, both Polin and Luce were firmly rooted in the traditional doctrinal 
framework.  The plaintiffs in both cases asserted, at least as the courts read their complaints, that 
they took the predictions at issue as guarantees.  Both courts, however, found that the respective 
accompanying disclosures rendered this inference unreasonable.  As a result, the courts 
concluded that even though the predictions turned out to be inaccurate they were not misleading 
when they were made.
2. The Bespeaks Caution Doctrine and Assumption Disclosure
Following Luce, the “bespeaks caution” language did not appear in another circuit court 
opinion until 1991, when the First, Second, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits cited either Luce, Polin, or 
54 Id. at 56 (citing Polin v. Conductron Corp., 552 F.2d 797, 806 n. 28 (8th Cir. 1977)).
55
 The substance of the warning in the partnership’s offering memorandum was essentially 
indistinguishable from the warning set forth in the SEC 1975 safe harbor proposal, which would have required 
issuers to alert investors that “there can be no assurance that the projection will be achieved.”  Notice of Proposed 
Rule 132, Securities Act Release No. 33,5581 (April 28, 1975) at 13.  This reading of the Luce court’s “bespeaks 
caution” holding is supported by the court’s subsequent discussion overturning the district court’s refusal to grant 
the plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint.  Although the court stated that “allegations that relate to the 
mismanagement of the project” could not survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion “even if made with more particularity,” 
802 F.2d at 56, it provided specific guidance as to how the misleading projection allegations could be rewritten to 
pass muster under both Rule 9(b) and Rule 12(b)(6):  “Amendments [to the complaint] relating to projections or 
expectations offered to induce investments must allege particular facts demonstrating the knowledge of defendants 
at the time that such statements were false.” Id.  Obviously, the court would not have given this instruction if its 
disinclination “to impose liability on the basis of statements that clearly ‘bespeak caution’” had been 
insurmountable.  Accordingly, had the plaintiffs followed the Second Circuit’s instruction and amended their 
complaint to allege that they inferred from the projections that the predicted outcomes were more likely than not 
(instead of that the projections were implicit guarantees) and that the defendants at the time of the offering held 
documents, such as IRS private ruling letters, indicating that the predicted tax benefits were extremely unlikely to be 
realized, the district court would have been unable to dismiss the amended complaint. 
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both in connection with their holdings that inaccurate predictions did not give rise to liability.56
All four of these decisions were rooted in the traditional doctrinal framework.  The two most 
instructive opinions, the First Circuit’s opinion in Romani v. Shearson Lehman Hutton57 and the 
Second Circuit’s opinion in I. Meyers Pincus & Associates, P.C. v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc.,58
both reflect the view that cautionary statements disclosing specific underlying assumptions may 
do more than simply prevent the inference that the projected results are guaranteed.59
In Romani, the general partners’ offering materials contained several optimistic 
predictions of future success of the partnership's horse breeding operations, including expected 
56
 In 1988, the Fifth Circuit cited the Luce court’s “bespeaks caution” holding but only in connection with 
an effort to summarize principles of law relating to predictive statements that it hoped would guide the lower court 
on remand. Isquith v. Middle South Utilities, Inc. 847 F.2d 186, 203-204 (5th Cir. 1988).  
57
 929 F.2d 875 (1991).
58
 936 F.2d 759 (1991).
59 The two other cases that cited Luce were Moorhead v. Merrill Lynch, 949 F.2d 243 (8th Cir., 1991) and 
Sinay v. Lamson, 948 F.2d 1037 (6th Cir., 1991).  Moorhead appears to stand for the unremarkable proposition that 
disclosures of specific underlying assumptions are just as effective as blanket warnings in preventing the inference 
that projected results are guaranteed.  The case involved an underwritten sale of bonds to finance the construction 
and operation of a retirement center.  The offering materials attached a “generally favorable” study generated by an 
independent feasibility consultant that disclosed in great detail the assumptions on which the feasibility of the debt 
repayment was based.  Within a year after construction was completed, however, the center became unable to 
service the debt and soon thereafter filed for bankruptcy protection.  The investors alleged that the “defendant . . . 
knowingly or recklessly issued the feasibility study which misrepresented that sufficient revenues would be 
generated to pay back the debt.” (emphasis added) Id. at 245.  Thus, it appears that the investors, like the Luce 
plaintiffs, asserted that the feasibility study implicitly assured investors that the center would be able to service the 
bonds.  Without extended analysis, the court, citing Polin and Luce, upheld the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment to the defendant:  “We agree with the district court and hold that plaintiffs could not base a federal 
securities fraud claim on any misrepresentation . . . in the feasibility study which was addressed by the repeated, 
specific warnings of significant risk factors and the disclosures of underlying factual assumptions also contained 
therein.” Id.  Although the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Sinay v. Lamson & Sessions Co. provides very little doctrinal 
discussion of the bespeaks caution doctrine, its application of the doctrine appears to be consistent with the 
reasoning of the Romani court discussed infra pp. 20-21.  In Sinay, a manufacturer of construction and 
transportation equipment products experienced a severe slow down after several years of rapid earnings growth.  948 
F.2d at 1038. The plaintiffs alleged that a company officer’s statement (made before the slow down became public) 
that he did “not quarrel with analysts’ earnings estimates in the area of $1.50 to $1.60” was misleading. Id. at 1039.  
The court identified various specific risk factors accompanying the statement and then without any discussion of the 
factors stated that “[i]n light of the cautionary language, [the officer’s] statement . . . is hardly the type of statement 
that would mislead a reasonable investor.” Id. at 1040.   The court then noted that its decision was also based on the 
fact that “the plaintiffs did not offer any objective evidence that the [forecasts] were anything other than honestly 
held convictions based on the historical information which Lamson possessed.”  Accordingly, the absence any 
discussion of the accompanying risk disclosures does not suggest that the court intended to adopt a bright-line rule 
that predictions accompanied by such disclosures are non-actionable per se, that is, non-actionable even if the 
predictions are not “honestly held convictions” or based on reliable information.   
21
partnership “cash distributions in excess of 13%.”60  Romani asserted that the predictions were 
misleading because the defendants did not disclose that “the standardbred horse industry was 
entering a recessionary period, making past performance an imperfect indicator of the future.”61
The court rejected this assertion because a report attached to the prospectus “detailed a number 
of specific problems facing the standardbred industry, including overbreeding, declining 
attendance at races and an average decline in yearling prices.”62  Accordingly, the court 
concluded:
[A]lthough the offering materials were optimistic about the prospects for [the 
partnership], the documents unquestionably warned potential investors in a 
meaningful way that economic conditions in the horsebreeding industry were 
uncertain.  Documents such at this, which “clearly ‘bespeak caution,’” are not the 
stuff of which securities fraud claims are made.63
In contrast to the plaintiffs in Polin and Luce, Romani did not allege that the 13% cash 
distribution or any of the other predictions amounted to a guarantee.  Instead, Romani alleged 
that the projection suggested that the partnership’s past performance was likely to continue and 
that this suggestion was false.  The court’s response was that the disclosures regarding several 
specific contingencies the occurrence of any of which would cause actual results to differ 
significantly from those projected made reading the projection to imply such a representation 
unreasonable.  The Romani court’s analysis thus mirrors the position implicit in the SEC’s 1978 
and 1979 releases that a projection with a low confidence level or high error rate may remain 
reasonably based if the factors giving rise to the uncertainties are disclosed.
60
 929 F.2d at 877.
61 Id. at 877.
62 Id. at 879.
63 Id.
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In I. Meyers Pincus & Associates, P.C. v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc.,64 the defendant, 
Oppenheimer, offered shares of a closed-end fund in a registered public offering.  In its 
prospectus, Oppenheimer noted that: “The shares of closed-end investment companies frequently 
trade at a discount from or premium to their net asset values.  The Shares are also expected to 
trade at a discount or premium.”65  Although Oppenheimer also stated in another section of the 
prospectus that “[s]hares of closed-end investment companies frequently trade at a discount from 
net asset value, but in some cases trade at a premium,”66 the plaintiff asserted that the first 
statement suggested that the shares were “as likely to trade at a premium as at a discount” and 
that this suggestion was misleading because “shares of closed-end investment companies 
‘usually and typically sell at discounts’ from the net asset value.”67
After observing that “[t]he central inquiry in determining whether a prospectus is 
materially misleading . . . is . . . whether defendant’s representations, taken together and in 
context, would have misled a reasonable investor about the nature of the investment,”68  the court 
concluded that the “discount or premium” statement, read in the context of the other statements 
in the prospectus, was not misleading:  “The statements contained within the prospectus clearly 
“bespeak caution,’ rather than encouraging optimism. . . .  No reasonable investor would be 
misled by the prospectus into believing that the Fund was predicting the success of its shares in a 
secondary market for them.”69 Of all the pre-1993 circuit court bespeaks caution cases,
64
 936 F.2d 759 (2nd Cir. 1991).
65 Id. at 761.
66 Id. at 762.
67 Id. at 761.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 763.  The court clearly did not intend to hold that one may always escape liability by discouraging 
optimism.  For example, had plaintiff made credible allegations that the defendant was aware of undisclosed fund-
specific factors that made the fund’s shares abnormally likely to trade at a discount, the relevant incorrect inference 
would not be that the shares were as likely to trade at a premium as at discount, but instead that they were not more 
likely to trade at a discount than the “average” closed end fund.  It is unlikely that statements in the prospectus 
would have rendered this incorrect inference unreasonable.
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Oppenheimer’s discussion most explicitly reflects the contours of the traditional doctrinal 
framework.  In the Second Circuits’s view, Oppenheimer’s accompanying disclosures rendered 
unreasonable the inference that the plaintiff allegedly drew regarding the likelihood that the 
shares would trade at a premium.  Accordingly, the court found that the prediction itself was not 
misleading even though the fund’s shares failed to trade at a premium.
III. EXITING THE TRADITIONAL DOCTRINAL FRAMEWORK: THE BESPEAKS CAUTION 
DOCTRINE AS A MATERIALITY TEST
Liability under all of the anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws requires, at a 
minimum, falsity and materiality.  The Oppenheimer court’s observation that “the central
inquiry” in determining whether projections are “materially misleading” is whether they “would 
have misled a reasonable investor,”70 highlights the priority that the traditional doctrinal 
framework gives to the inquiry into the falsity of a projection.  The courts in all of the pre-1993
bespeaks caution cases viewed the inquiry into whether a forward-looking statement was 
misleading or “false when made” as the “central inquiry” because they assumed that such falsity, 
if established, would likely be material.  Throughout the gradual reversal of the SEC’s position 
on the disclosure of projections discussed above, the Commission and the courts operated under 
the same assumption.71
Because virtually all pre -1993 approaches to forward-looking information placed the 
falsity inquiry ahead of the materiality inquiry, their development rarely crossed paths with the 
development of materiality doctrine during this period.  In contrast, the materiality, as well as the 
falsity, of forward-looking information was contested in Virginia Bankshares v. Sandberg. 72
70 Id. at 761.
71
 Without the assumption that the predictive information would typically influence investment decisions 
the Commission’s policy prohibiting the disclosure of such information in Commission filings would have made 
little sense.  See supra note 23 and accompanying text.  
72
 501 U.S. 1083 (1991).
24
Accordingly, the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Virginia Bankshares should have guided 
subsequent lower court analyses of both the falsity and materiality of forward-looking 
information.  This Part begins with a brief overview of the Court’s development of materiality 
doctrine prior to Virginia Bankshares.  It then reviews the principles of the Virginia Bankshares
falsity and materiality analyses and demonstrates their consistency with the traditional 
framework for evaluating the actionability of inaccurate forward-looking information.  Finally, 
this Part reviews the Third Circuit’s analysis in Trump and contrasts the analysis with the
Virginia Bankshares materiality analysis to demonstrate that while courts and Congress accepted 
Trump as an accurate articulation of the bespeaks caution doctrine, the Third Circuit’s approach
was in fact a fundamental departure from prior case law.
A. The Supreme Court’s Development of Materiality Doctrine
Lower courts applied a variety of materiality definitions from the 1930s through the late 
1960s.73  In 1970, the Supreme Court missed an opportunity to establish a uniform materiality 
standard in Mills v. Electric by stating both that materiality “indubitably embodies a conclusion 
that the defect was of such a character that it might have been considered important by a 
reasonable shareholder” and that materiality requires that the “defect have a significant 
propensity to affect” a shareholder’s decision making process.74  Six years later, in TSC 
73 See generally E. C. Lashbrooke, Jr., The Alternative-Action Requirement: the Derailment of Sante Fe, 
1981 DUKE L.J. 963, 972 (“Since the inception of an implied civil cause of action for a violation of section 10(b) 
and rule 10b-5, the federal courts have been formulating a definition of materiality. The test for materiality has 
ranged from a realistic view to a reasonable man standard to a marketplace effects test.”) 
74
 Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 378.  Mills was decided in the middle of an era of 
expansive interpretations of the federal securities laws by the courts.  According to most commentators this era 
began about 1965 and continued until 1975.  See Louis Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 1058 (1983); 
see also 1 Alan R. Bromberg & Lewis B. Lowenfels, Securities Fraud & Commodities Fraud § 2.2, at 462 (2d ed. 
1994).  During this time period, the Supreme Court upheld various “implied rights of action” that many lower courts 
had inferred from the federal securities acts and regulations, including Rule 10b-5 and Rule 14a-9.  Starting in the 
mid-1970s, the Supreme Court gradually pared back these implied rights of action.  One of the perceived problems 
targeted by the Court’s decisions was the purportedly unchecked multiplication of forms of liability based on rule 
10b-5.  The Court’s 1975 opinion in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores contained its most explicit 
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Industries v. Northway, Inc., the Court eliminated much of this ambiguity.75  The court of 
appeals, citing Mills, had defined material facts as “all facts, which a reasonable shareholder 
might consider important”76 and applying that definition found that alleged omissions from the 
defendant’s proxy statement were material as a matter of law.  Rejecting this standard as 
“unnecessarily low,”77 the TSC Industries Court stated: “An omitted fact is material if there is a 
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how 
to vote.”78
Although this “substantial likelihood” materiality standard raised the liability bar under 
the securities laws in several circuits, the Court cautioned against the creation of standards 
designed to permit courts to resolve materiality issues by summary judgment:  “Only if the 
established omissions are ‘so obviously important to an investor, that reasonable minds cannot 
differ on the question of materiality’ is the ultimate issue of materiality appropriately resolved 
‘as a matter of law’ by summary judgment.”79  Just a few years later, however, the Third Circuit 
disregarded this instruction and developed a single-factor materiality test under which a judge 
could find a company’s public statements regarding a potential merger with another company 
immaterial as a matter of law without ever directly assessing the importance of the statements to 
endorsement of the view that judicial expansion of Rule 10b-5 had gone too far. 421 U.S. 723, 739 (1975) (“There 
has been widespread recognition that litigation under rule 10b-5 presents a danger of vexatiousness different in 
degree and kind from that which accompanies litigation in general.”)
75
 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
76 Id. at 445.
77 Id. at 448.
78 Id. at 449.  According to the Court, such importance “does not require proof of a substantial likelihood 
that disclosure of the omitted fact would have caused the reasonable investor to change his vote. What the standard 
does contemplate is a showing of a substantial likelihood that, under all the circumstances, the omitted fact would 
have assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder. Put another way, there must be a 
substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as 
having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.” Id.
79 Id. at 450 (quoting John Hopkins U. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124, 1129 (D. Md. 1970)).
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investors.80  Several years later, after other lower courts had adopted the Third Circuit’s single-
factor materiality test, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson and 
rejected the test.81  After holding that TSC Industries provided the appropriate definition of 
materiality in the context of Rule 10b-5, the Court found the Third Circuit’s test was 
fundamentally inconsistent with that definition:
A bright-line rule indeed is easier to follow than a standard that requires the 
exercise of judgment in the light of all the circumstances.  But ease of application 
alone is not an excuse for ignoring the purposes of the Securities Acts and 
Congress’ policy decisions.  Any approach that designates a single fact or 
occurrence as always determinative of an inherently fact specific finding such as 
materiality, must necessarily be overinclusive or underinclusive.82
B. The Supreme Court’s Articulation of the Traditional Doctrinal Framework in Virginia 
Bankshares
Neither TSC Industries nor Basic involved forward-looking information.  In fact, the 
Court in Basic distinguished the non-predictive soft information at issue from “other kinds of 
contingent of speculative information, such as earnings forecasts or projections.”  Consequently, 
Basic left open the possibility that single-factor materiality tests for forward-looking information 
80 See Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196 (3d Cir. 1982).
81
 485 U.S. 224, 230-241 (1998).
82 Id. at 236.  The emergence in the lower courts of bright-line tests occurred in the context of materiality 
assessments regarding non-forward-looking information.  As noted above, courts generally assumed the materiality 
of disclosed projections and were rarely were compelled to question that assumption.  Several circuit courts that 
addressed the materiality of undisclosed projections during this time period, however, applied heightened materiality 
standards to find those projections immaterial.  Notwithstanding the SEC’s position against requiring issuers to 
disclose projections, the courts in these cases accepted the plaintiffs’ contention that defendants were under a 
general duty to disclose all material information related to a certain subject.  Thus, to hold that the defendants had 
not violated this general duty, the courts had to find that the internal projections at issue were immaterial.  In the 
1978 case of James v. Gerber Products Co., for example, the Sixth Circuit first stated that TSC Industries made the 
reasonable investor inquiry mandatory but then after noting that “[t]he undisclosed information in dispute . . . is 
comprised of interim earnings figures that circulated through Gerber in the normal course of its business,” held that 
“[s]uch sales figures, projections, forecasts and the like only rise to the level of materiality when they can be 
calculated with substantial certainty.” 587 F.2d 324, 327 (6th Cir. 1978).  In its 1984 opinion in Flynn v. Bass 
Brothers Enterprise Inc., the Third Circuit also began by reciting the TSC Industries materiality definition and then 
stated that it saw “no reason not to utilize the same formulation for evaluating materiality in the context of a tender 
offer.” 744 F.2d 978, 984 (1984).  The court ultimately held, however, that in the case of undisclosed projections, 
the TSC Industries materiality test requires a court to balance “the potential aid such information will give a 
shareholder against the potential harm, such as undue reliance, if the information is released without a proper 
cautionary note.” Id. at 988.  Instead of inventing materiality tests inconsistent with TSC Industries, these courts 
should have developed exceptions to the applicable duty to disclose all material information.
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might still pass muster.83 Three years later, when the Supreme Court again addressed materiality 
in Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, the Court’s opinion should have finally foreclosed that 
possibility.84  In Virginia Bankshares, directors of a bank solicited proxies for approval of the 
bank’s merger into its parent, which owned 85% of the bank’s shares.  After the transaction was 
consummated, a minority shareholder of the bank sued the bank and its directors asserting that 
the proxy statement was materially misleading in violation Exchange Act Rule 14a-9.  The Court 
of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court in favor of the shareholder.  In particular, the 
Court of Appeals found materially misleading the proxy statement’s assertions that the Plan of 
Merger had been approved by the Board of Directors because it provided an opportunity for the 
Bank’s public shareholders to achieve a “high” value for their shares and that the $42 per share 
merger price was “fair.”85  Before the Supreme Court, the bank argued both that such 
“statements of opinion or belief . . . cannot be actionable as misstatements of material fact . . . 
within the meaning of Rule 14a-9” and that even if the statements could violate the rule, the 
bank’s “high” and “fair” statements did not because the assertions were accompanied by 
“statements of fact sufficient to enable readers to draw their own independent conclusions.”86
83
 Besides the Third Circuit in Trump, several other Circuit courts have applied single-factor materiality 
tests to forward-looking information.  In Helwig v. Vencor, for example, an en banc Sixth Circuit case, a six member 
dissent argued that the Circuit’s substantial certainty test developed in the context of undisclosed projections applied 
to disclosed projections as well.  251 F.3d 540, 546 (6th Cir. 2001).  Similarly, the Fourth Circuit has repeatedly 
used a single-factor “guarantee” materiality test to affirm dismissal of complaints alleging false projections.  
According to this test, a projection is immaterial unless its presentation suggests to the investor that management has 
guaranteed the predicted results. See e.g., Hillison Partners Ltd. P’Ship v. Adage, Inc., 42 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 1994) 
and Raab v. Gen. Physics Corp., 4 F.3d 286 (4th Cir. 1993).  These two single-factor materiality tests have remained 
largely confined to the Sixth and Fourth Circuits.
84
 501 U.S. 1083 (1991).
85 Id. at 1088-1089.
86 Id. at 1090.
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Although the Court did not attach the “forward-looking statement” label to the board’s 
statements, it clearly recognized that the statements were, at least in part, forward-looking.87
Taking the bank’s actionability argument first,88 the Court demonstrated through an 
articulation of the traditional framework that the bank’s “opinion” statements could qualify as 
misstatements of fact:  “[Opinion statements are] factual in two senses:  as statements that the 
directors do . . . hold the belief stated and as statements about the subject matter of the . . . belief 
expressed.”89  The first sense identified by the court is a straightforward application of the 
traditional doctrinal framework.  Because it is reasonable for an investor to infer from the 
publication of an opinion statement by management that management in fact holds the opinion 
published, if that inference is incorrect the opinion statement itself qualifies as a factual 
misstatement.
The second sense in which an opinion statement is factual, as a statement “about its 
subject matter,” likewise grows out of the traditional doctrinal framework.  The bank argued that 
the statements were not factual in this sense because they were not expressed in “dollars and 
cents, but focused instead on the ‘indefinite and unverifiable’ term, ‘high’ value.”90  Rejecting 
this argument, the Court described the meaning of “subject matter” it had in mind:
[This] objection ignores the fact that such conclusory terms in a commercial 
context are reasonably understood to rest on a factual basis that justifies them as 
accurate, the absence of which renders them misleading.  Provable facts either 
furnish good reasons to make a conclusory judgment, or they count against it, and 
87
 For example, the Court observed that “whether $42 was ‘high,’” depended upon “actual and potential
levels of operation.” Id. at 1094 (emphasis added).
88
 The Court easily concluded that management’s statements of opinion could be material.  After briefly 
discussing the importance to investors required for materiality under TSC Industries, the Court stated: “We think 
there is no room to deny that . . . a statement of belief by corporate directors about a recommended course of action . 
. . can take on just that importance.  Shareholders know that directors usually have knowledge and expertness far 
exceeding the normal investor’s resources . . . . ”  Id. at 1090-1091.
89 Id. at 1092.
90 Id. at 1093.
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expressions of such judgments can be uttered with knowledge of truth or falsity 
just like more definite statements. . . .91
In other words, because it is reasonable for shareholders and investors to infer from 
management’s publication of its judgment about a certain matter that the judgment rests on a 
factual basis, if this inference is incorrect the judgment statement itself qualifies as a factual 
misstatement.92  Applying this approach to the bank’s “high” and “fair” value statement, the 
Court found that the evidence adduced by the plaintiff warranted the conclusion “that the 
statement was misleading about its subject matter and a false expression of the director’s reasons 
[for recommending the merger to shareholders].”93
The Court then turned to the bank’s argument that its statements were not actionable 
because the proxy statement contained “statements of fact sufficient to enable readers to draw 
their own independent conclusions.”94  Although the Court could have read this allegation to 
pertain to the “falsity” of the bank’s statements, it chose instead to read the allegation as an 
91 Id.
92
 It follows from the Court’s discussion that material falsity of either “sense” should be sufficient to trigger 
liability.  The Court, however, held that where statements are not also false as to “subject matter,” a plaintiff may 
not prevail solely on “proof of mere disbelief or belief undisclosed:”  “[T]o recognize liability on mere disbelief or 
undisclosed motive without any demonstration that the . . . statement was false or misleading about its subject would 
authorize . . . litigation confined solely to what one skeptical court spoke of as the ‘impurities’ of a director’s 
‘unclean heart.’  This, we think, would cross the line that Blue Chip Stamps sought to draw.   . . .[T]he temptation to 
rest an otherwise nonexistent . . . action on psychological enquiry alone would threaten just the sort of strike suits 
and attrition by discovery that Blue Chip Stamps sought to discourage.” Id. at 1096 (citing Stedman v. Storer, 308 
F.Supp. 881, 887 (SDNY 1969) (dealing with § 10(b)).  The same concerns regarding “strike suits and attrition by 
discovery” would later motivate Congress’ enactment of the PSLRA.  As discussed infra Part IV, Virginia 
Bankshares’ response to these concerns foreshadows a necessary adjustment to the contours of a PSLRA safe harbor 
interpretation based on the traditional doctrinal framework.  It is also worth noting that the court’s “psychological” 
and “subject matter” senses of falsity mirror the good faith and reasonable basis elements of Rule 175.  The 
“misstatement of the psychological fact” that a manager holds the opinions he is stating and the absence of “good 
faith” are forms of what is often referred to as subjective falsity.  Implicit “subject matter” or “reasonable basis” 
misrepresentations, on the other hand, are both forms of objective falsity.  The conjunctive nature of Rule 175 
suggests that, in contrast to the view of the Virginia Bankshares Court, the Commission believed that liability could 
be based on subjective falsity alone.
93 Id. at 1094.
94 Id. at 1097.
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assertion that the “high” and “fair” value statements were immaterial.95  This decision 
precipitated the Court’s development of analytically clear precedent regarding the appropriate 
materiality standard for forward-looking information accompanied by disclosures pertaining to 
the “subject matter” of the prediction:
While a misleading statement will not always lose its deceptive edge simply by 
joinder with others that are true, the true statements may discredit the other one so 
obviously that the risk of real deception drops to nil.  Since liability under § 14(a) 
must rest not only on deceptiveness but materiality as well . . . petitioners are on 
perfectly firm ground insofar as they argue that publishing accurate facts in a 
proxy statement can render a misleading proposition too unimportant to ground 
liability.  But not every mixture with the true will neutralize the deceptive. . . . 
Only when the inconsistency would exhaust the misleading conclusion’s capacity 
to influence the reasonable shareholder would a § 14(a) action fail on the element 
of materiality.96
After settling on this framework for assessing the impact of accompanying statements on a 
misleading statement’s materiality, the court required little effort to find that the bank’s 
accompanying statements did not substantially diminish the importance of the bank’s assertions 
that the deal offered shareholders a “high” and “fair” value:  “Suffice it to say that the evidence 
95
 In other words, the Court read the bank’s pleadings to assert that even assuming the use of the word 
“high” was an inaccurate statement of the directors’ opinions, that inaccuracy was immaterial.  The Court might 
have read this contention to assert that the accompanying “statements of fact” (notwithstanding the omission of 
other relevant facts) gave shareholders an accurate picture of what the directors believed when they stated that $42 
was a “high” price or, in other words, that, taken in context, the use of the word “high” was not misleading.  Neither 
of these two analyses of the impact of accompanying disclosure is reducible to the other.  When a court reads an 
asserted defense based on accompanying statements in terms of falsity, then its discussion should focus on what 
investors should have understood the prediction or opinion to mean in the context of the accompanying statements.  
In contrast, where the defendant contends that accompanying statements rendered a prediction or opinion 
immaterial, the defendant is asking the court to assume for purposes of the contention that the statement is false and 
to assess whether the false impression created by the statement really mattered to investors.  Because it adopted the 
latter approach, the Virginia Bankshares Court assumed that the proposed deal did not offer a “high” value under 
any reasonable interpretation of that term.  To find this statement was immaterial, the court would have had to 
conclude that the accompanying statements so clearly demonstrated that the proposed deal did not offer a “high” 
value that no reasonable investor would have given any credence to the contrary statement in the proxy materials.
96 Id. at 1097-1098.
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invoked by [the bank] in the instant case fell short of compelling the jury to find the facial 
materiality of the misleading statement neutralized.”97
Two observations regarding the Court’s description of the circumstances under which 
accompanying disclosures may render an opinion statement immaterial bear mention here.  First, 
the description is consistent with TSC Industries and Basic.  If after undertaking the “delicate 
assessment” required by TSC Industries of the impact of the disclosures on an inaccurate opinion 
or forward-looking statement, a judge or jury finds that the accompanying disclosures “discredit” 
the statement “so obviously that the risk of real deception drops to nil,” the statement may be 
properly deemed immaterial.  In other words, an opinion or prediction is immaterial when the 
accompanying disclosures prevent reasonable investors from drawing any inference from the 
projection’s disclosure that would “assume[] actual significance in [their] deliberations.”98
Second, the Court’s materiality analysis will almost never be useful to a defendant seeking to 
avoid liability for an inaccurate prediction.  Situations in which an issuer’s accompanying 
disclosures obviously discredit a published prediction are very rare if they exist at all.  It difficult 
to conceive of circumstances, for example, in which a company press release providing earnings 
guidance might contain other statements that discredit the guidance.  The same is true of all types 
97 Id.  In addition, it is not clear from the facts of the Virginia Bankshares case that the $42 fair price 
statement would have been rendered immaterial even if the Board had disclosed the omitted facts relating to the 
subject matter of the $42 fair price statement.  One of those omitted facts was that the market for the Bank’s shares 
was “closed, thin, and dominated by [a single large shareholder].” 501 U.S. at 1093.  Another was evidence of a 
“going concern” value of more than $60 per share.  In the absence of these disclosures, a reasonable investor, 
depending on his prior understanding of the Bank’s business and trading history, may have inferred either (1) that 
the $42 per share merger price reflected a higher value than the Bank’s value as a going concern or (2) that 
notwithstanding the Bank’s higher value as a going concern, other factors made the merger at the $42 price 
compelling, including, perhaps, that the merger represented shareholders’ only liquidity opportunity for the 
foreseeable future.  Disclosure of the evidence of a going concern value of more than $60 and of the thinness of the 
trading market obviously would have rendered the first inference unreasonable.  The disclosure would not 
necessarily have made the second inference unreasonable, however, and because this inference likely would have 
assumed actual significance in the minds of reasonable investors, the Board’s statement that $42 represented a fair 
value would likely have remained material.
98 TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
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of projections intentionally published by issuers whether in press releases, SEC filings, or other 
written format.99
C. The Third Circuit’s Conversion of the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine Into a Materiality Test in 
In Re Donald J. Trump Casino Securities Litigation100
The Virginia Bankshares discussion of the “sen ses” in which management’s published 
beliefs or opinions may qualify as factual misstatements was a relatively complete, if somewhat 
obscure, articulation of the traditional doctrinal framework.  Accordingly, the case should have 
led courts to apply the framework in subsequent cases involving allegedly misleading forward 
looking information.  Unfortunately, this did not happen.  Instead, Virginia Bankshares, as 
misread by the Third Circuit in Trump two years later, to some extent inspired the Third Circuit’s 
materiality-based version of the bespeaks caution doctrine.  The Trump defendants formed a 
partnership for the acquisition and completion of the Taj Mahal casino in Atlantic City.101  The 
Taj Mahal construction was completed but the partnership was ultimately unable to service the 
debt.102  When the plaintiffs learned that the partnership planned to file for bankruptcy 
protection, they sued alleging that the prospectus covering the bond issuance was materially 
misleading because the defendants had “neither an honest belief in nor a reasonable basis [for]” 
the partnership’s prediction in the prospectus that “funds generated from the operation of the Taj 
Mahal will be sufficient to cover all of its debt service (interest and principal).”103
99
 The Court’s holding may be useful in the case of the over-exuberant executive prone to making off-the-
cuff projections.  The Court’s analysis suggests that the executive’s company or the executive himself could render 
any inaccuracies in such projections immaterial by immediately correcting the projection in a way that obviously 
discredits it.
100
 7 F.3d 357 (1993).
101 Id. at 364.
102 Id. at 365.
103 Id. at 366.  The plaintiffs buttressed this contention with allegations that “1) the Taj Mahal required an 
average ‘casino win’ of approximately $1.3; 2) Donald Trump had personally guaranteed hundreds of millions of 
dollars in bank loans for other properties; and 3) the Taj Mahal had an ‘unprecedented’ debt to equity ratio,” none of 
which was disclosed in the prospectus. Id.
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After summarizing earlier bespeaks caution cases, the district court concluded that the 
cases established per se rule against the actionability of projections accompanied by cautionary 
language such as that contained the defendants’ prospectus.104  The court then acknowledged the 
“troubling possibility” that such a doctrine would “encourage management to conceal deliberate 
misrepresentations beneath the mantle of broad cautionary language.”105  The court therefore 
held that the per se rule should only be triggered by “precise cautionary language which directly 
addressed itself to future projections, estimates or forecasts in a prospectus.”106
On appeal, the Third Circuit multiplied the district court’s errors.  Failing to perceive the 
common doctrinal framework underlying the holdings in the previous bespeaks caution cases and 
the Virginia Bankshares’ discussion of the “senses” in which a management’s published 
judgments may be factual and therefore false, the Third Circuit instead linked the bespeaks 
caution doctrine to the separate discussion in Virginia Bankshares of the impact of 
accompanying disclosures on an opinion statement’s materiality: “[B]y recognizing that an 
accompanying statement may neutralize the effect of a misleading statement, the [Virginia 
104 In re Donald J. Trump Casino Securities Litigation, 793 F.Supp. 543 (N.J. 1992).  The district court 
began its analysis by reviewing the “origins of the ‘Bespeaks Caution’ approach.”  Id. at 549.  After citing Polin and
briefly discussing Luce, the court turned to “recent developments in the bespeaks caution doctrine” and summarized 
the four 1991 circuit court bespeaks caution cases discussed supra Part II.  Id. at 549-551.  The court then described 
the conflict between the parties’ positions as follows:  “[Plaintiffs] argue that they have adequately pled [that the 
prospectus contained misrepresentations]. . . .   However, defendants maintain that a prospectus which ‘bespeaks 
caution’ displaces a misrepresentation claim. . . .   Thus, we must decide which comes first in our consideration of 
this case:  the cautionary language of the prospectus, or the allegation of misrepresentation in the complaint.” Id. at 
552.  The court then stated its view that, properly applied, the “‘bespeaks caution’ analysis would subsume or 
obviate the analysis regarding adequate allegations of falsity” and cited the following instruction from Sinay v. 
Lamson as support for this proposition:  “[I]n determining whether the statements are actionable, the court must 
scrutinize the nature of the statement to determine whether the statement was false when made.  While analyzing the 
nature of the statement, the court must emphasize whether ‘the prediction suggested reliability, bespoke caution, was 
made in good faith, or had a sound factual or historical basis.’” Id. at 553.  In the district court’s view, by using the 
word “emphasize” and including whether a statement bespoke caution among its list of considerations, the Sixth 
Circuit “indicat[ed] that such a factor is at lease a powerful consideration and may even be dispositive.” Id.
105 Id. at 554.
106 Id.
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Bankshares] court impliedly accepted the logic of the bespeaks caution doctrine.”107  As a result, 
the Third Circuit asserted that the reasoning of Virginia Bankshares “support[ed]”108 its version 
of the bespeaks caution doctrine, which it described as “essentially shorthand for the well-
established principle that a statement or omission must be considered in context, so that 
accompanying statements may render it immaterial as a matter of law.”109
Because the Third Circuit so explicitly based its “bespeaks caution” analysis on 
materiality, the distinctiveness of the court’s approach from the reasoning in the prior bespeaks 
caution cases is unmistakable despite the general lack of rhetorical precision in the earlier 
bespeaks caution opinions.  For example, after choosing its materiality-based approach, the Third 
Circuit began its analysis with a discussion of the Supreme Court’s definition of materiality in 
TSC Industries.110 In contrast, none of the prior circuit court bespeaks caution opinions 
contained any reference to TSC Industries.  Following its discussion of TSC Industries, the Third 
Circuit cited each of the 1991 circuit court bespeaks caution cases and then asserted that the 
lower court had only “followed the lead” of these courts, which “dismissed securities fraud 
claims under Rule 12(b)(6) because cautionary language in the offering document negated the 
materiality of an alleged misrepresentation.”111 Not surprisingly, however, the court did not 
quote any language from the courts’ opinions or discuss other aspects of the cases that could
suggest that the judges in those cases understood the cautionary language in question to “negate[] 
the materiality of an alleged misrepresentation.”  Nevertheless, purportedly on the basis of these 
cases, the court concluded “as a general matter” that: 
107
 7 F.3d at 372.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 364.
110 Id. at 369.
111 Id. at 371. 
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When an offering document’s forecasts, opinions or projections are accompanied 
by meaningful cautionary statements, the forward-looking statements will not 
form the basis for a securities fraud claim if those statements did not affect the 
“total mix” of information the document provided investors.  In other words, 
cautionary language, if sufficient, renders the alleged . . . misrepresentations 
immaterial as a matter of law.112
Although this statement has nothing to do with the logic of the pre-1993 bespeaks caution 
decisions, the statement faithfully summarizes the Virginia Bankshares’ holding that 
accompanying disclosures may so obviously discredit an estimate that it ceases to assume actual 
significance in the minds of investors.  Such information would indeed fail to impact the total 
mix of information affecting investment decisions regarding the security in question.  If the error 
in the Third Circuit’s analysis had been nothing more than mislabeling the Virginia Bankshares
materiality analysis as an application of the bespeaks caution doctrine, the court’s decision may 
have done little harm.  Had the Third Circuit actually applied the Virginia Bankshares
materiality analysis to the Trump  facts, however, it could not have affirmed the district court’s 
dismissal of the case.  As noted above, the plaintiffs’ primary allegation was that the statement in 
the prospectus of the Partnership’s prediction that “funds generated from the operation of the Taj 
Mahal will be sufficient to cover all of its debt service”113 was materially misleading.  Neither 
the defendants nor the court asserted that the accompanying disclosures in the prospectus so 
obviously discredited this prediction that its capacity to influence potential buyers of the debt 
was exhausted.  In fact, both the parties and the court apparently understood that the investors 
chose to invest in the bonds, notwithstanding the risks disclosed in the prospectus, precisely 
because they accepted the Partnership’s view that the likelihood that cash flows from operations 
would be sufficient to repay the debt was great enough to accept those risks.  In other words, this 
112 Id.
113 Id. at 366.
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prediction was not just a material motivation for the investors’ decision to invest, it was the 
primary motivation.  Accordingly, if the statement was actually false as the plaintiffs alleged, it 
was impossible for the Third Circuit to apply the Virginia Bankshares materiality holding to 
dismiss the plaintiffs’ case.  Because the Third Circuit was unwilling to question its mistaken 
premise that under the bespeaks caution doctrine accompanying statements negate the materiality
of a projection, this impossibility forced the court to develop a substitute test for the assessment 
required by Virginia Bankshares of whether “the inconsistency would exhaust the misleading 
conclusion’s capacity to influence the reasonable shareholder.”  In the district court’s conclusion 
that the “bespeaks caution doctrine applies only to precise cautionary language which directly 
addresses itself to future projections,”114 the Third Circuit found the content.  By slightly altering 
the language of the district court’s per se rule, the Third Circuit converted the rule into a new 
single-factor “bespeaks caution” materiality test:  “To suffice, the cautionary statements must be 
substantive and tailored to the specific future projections, estimates or opinions . . . which the 
plaintiffs challenge.”115  Applying the new test to facts before it, the court held “that the plaintiffs 
have failed to state an actionable claim regarding the statement that the Partnership believed it 
could repay the bonds.  We can say that the prospectus here truly bespeaks caution . . . .   [T]he 
cautionary statements were tailored precisely to address the uncertainty concerning the 
Partnership’s prospective ability to repay the bondholders.”116
114 In re Donald J. Trump Casino Securities Litigation, 793 F.Supp. 543, 554 (N.J. 1992).
115
 7 F.3d at 371-372. 
116 Id. at 372.  That the debt service prediction in the partnership’s prospectus was material under an 
application of the Virginia Bankshares materiality test does not mean that the plaintiffs’ complaint should have 
withstood the defendant’s 12b-6 motion.  Had the Third Circuit applied the traditional doctrinal framework it may 
well have found that the accompanying disclosures made any potentially misleading inferences unreasonable and 
thus that the prediction itself, although inaccurate, was not misleading.  For example, had the Trump plaintiffs 
asserted that they inferred from the debt service predictions that repayment was very likely, or even more likely than 
not, it is quite possible that the court could have found that this inference was unreasonable in light of the 
accompanying disclosures, which the Court correctly observed did “address the uncertainty concerning the 
Partnership’s prospective ability to repay the bondholders.”  In the terminology of Virginia Bankshares, inferences 
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Unlike prior single-factor materiality tests, which remained confined to the circuits in 
which they developed, the Third Circuit’s reformulated bespeaks caution doctrine was quickly 
absorbed into the case law of other circuits.  Between 1993 and 1995, most lower courts that 
used the “bespeaks caution” phrase cited Trump’s statement that “cautionary language, if 
sufficient, renders the alleged . . . misrepresentations immaterial as a matter of law” as an 
accurate description of the bespeaks caution doctrine.117 Not surprisingly, this wide-spread 
judicial acceptance of the Third Circuit’s materiality-based bespeaks caution doctrine gradually 
spilled over into ongoing Congressional deliberations regarding reform the nation's private 
securities litigation system.118 For example, a June 1995 report by the Senate’s Committee on 
drawn from the publication of the prediction regarding the likelihood of debt service are inferences regarding the 
“subject matter” of the prediction.  The Trump plaintiffs apparently emphasized the other “sense” in which an 
opinion or prediction may be factual and therefore false, namely, as “a misstatement of the psychological fact of the 
speaker’s belief in what he says.”  Virginia Bankshares v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1092 (1991).  Again, had the 
Third Circuit applied the traditional doctrinal framework to the plaintiff’s allegation that this implied representation 
was false, it could have required the plaintiffs to demonstrate the existence of inside information suggesting that 
revenues from operations would almost certainly be inadequate to service the bonds.  Because the issue in Trump
was the sufficiency of the plaintiffs’ complaint, the court could have required the plaintiffs to make particularized 
factual allegations from which a legal inference that such inside information existed at the time of the offering could 
be drawn.  The plaintiffs’ alleged that just such information existed with respect to another projection in the 
prospectus, which estimated “that as of its opening date the Taj Mahal would be worth approximately $1.1 billion.”  
Id. at 373.  The estimate was based on a third-party appraisal.  The allegation stated that the third party had used an 
irrational appraisal method and that the use of this method was not disclosed.  Id.  The court held that the cautionary 
language regarding the estimate still met its “substantive and tailored” test, but, perhaps sensing the weakness of its 
materiality-based approach, added: “We further note that the plaintiff’s allegation concerning the appraisal report 
fails to satisfy the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b).” Id.
117 See, e.g., Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 166-167 (5th Cir. 1994) and Saltzberg v. TM 
Sterling/Austin Accocs., 45 F.3d 399 (11th Cir. 1995).
118 The first securities litigation reform bills were introduced in 1993. See S. 3181 102nd Cong. (1992); 
H.R. 417 103rd Cong. (1993); and S. 1976 103rd Cong. (1994).  Around the same time, the Commission began 
considering changes to the Rule 175 safe harbor.  In 1994, the Commission issued a concept release and solicited 
public comment regarding whether the Rule 175 safe harbor was “effective in encouraging disclosure of voluntary 
forward-looking information and protecting investors or, if not, [whether it] should be revised. . . .”  Safe Harbor for 
Forward-Looking Statements, Securities Act Release No. 33,7101 (Oct. 13, 1994) at 9.  The release began by 
reasserting the Commission’s position on the importance to investors of projections: “Forward-looking information 
occupies a vital role in the United States securities markets. Investors typically consider management’s forward-
looking information important and useful in evaluating a company’s economic prospects and consequently in 
making their investment decisions.  Analysts and other market participants report that they view consideration of 
management’s own performance projections, i.e., earnings and revenues, to be critical to their own forecasts of a 
company’s future performance.  As such, forward-looking information is often considered a critical component of 
investment recommendations made by broker-dealers, investment advisers and other securities professionals.” Id. at 
1.  After Republicans took control of the House of Representatives in 1994, party leaders made elimination of 
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Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs on proposed securities litigation reform legislation quoted 
at length Trump’s description of the doctrine as a materiality-based approach to evaluating 
inaccurate forward-looking statements and singled-out Trump as an “oft-cited” bespeaks caution 
case.119 Similarly, the December 1995 conference committee report on H.R. 1058 (which 
ultimately became the PSLRA after Congress voted to override a veto of the bill by President 
Clinton) reflects the assumption by members of the Committee that the legal significance of 
statements accompanying a prediction is their impact on the prediction’s materiality.120
IV. INTERPRETING THE PSLRA SAFE HARBOR PROVISIONS TO ESTABLISH A SINGLE 
FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING LIABILITY FOR INACCURATE PREDICTIONS
The widespread assumption among members of Congress that the bespeaks caution 
doctrine developed as a materiality-based approach to forward-looking information led members 
of the H.R. 1058 conference committee to also assume that by adopting a “meaningful 
cautionary statements” safe harbor provision Congress would establish a statutory formula for 
rendering predictions immaterial.  Nothing in the legislative history of the PSLRA, however, 
suggests that this view was based on any deliberations regarding the distinctions between 
perceived abuses in private securities litigation a key objective in their broader private civil litigation reform 
campaign.  H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369, at [43] (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 741. In early 1995, 
House Republicans introduced a new securities litigation reform bill that was much more aggressive than the earlier 
proposals. H.R. 10, 104th Cong. (1995).  H.R. 10 would have become the “Common Sense Legal Reform Act of 
1995.”  Title I of the bill dealt with product liability reform and Title II with private securities litigation reform.  As 
the year wore on, however, most of the provisions in Title II were softened or replaced entirely through efforts to 
create broader congressional support for the reforms.  In the end, a compromise bill passed by the House and Senate 
garnered sufficient support to override a veto of the bill by President Clinton. See generally H.R. 1058, 104th Cong. 
(1995).  For a chronology of events leading to the enactment of the PSLRA, see John W. Avery, Securities 
Litigation Reform: The Long and Winding Road to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 Bus. 
Law. 335 (1996).
119
 1995 Committee Reports, p. 12, June 19, 1995.
120
 After discussing the types of information that should qualify accompanying statements as “meaningful” 
for purposes of the first prong of the safe harbor, the Committee’s report states: “Courts may continue to find a 
forward-looking statement immaterial . . . on other grounds.” H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, [43]  (1995).  Although 
this statement is somewhat ambiguous, it appears to reflect the assumption that judicial application of the bespeaks 
caution doctrine might in some instances render a statement immaterial even though the accompanying statements in 
question did not satisfy the first prong of the safe harbor.  This reading of the statement is confirmed by a 
subsequent section of the report that notes the Committee did “not intend for the safe harbor provisions to replace 
the judicial ‘bespeaks caution’ doctrine or to foreclose further development of that doctrine by the courts.” Id.
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materiality-based and falsity-based evaluations of forward-looking information.  In fact, there is 
no indication in the legislative history that any of the legislators grasped that the legal relevance 
of accompanying statements could be conceptualized in any terms other than materiality.  
Instead, it appears that members of Congress simply took as granted Trump’s assertion that the 
primary relevance of accompanying cautionary language is its impact on a projection’s
materiality because cases subsequent to Trump gave them no reason to questions this assertion.
The safe harbor language that Congress enacted, however, does not clearly require a 
materiality-based approach to evaluating whether issuers should be liable if their published 
predictions turn out to be wrong.  Instead, congressional negotiations and ultimately unsuccessful 
attempts to satisfy the concerns of the Clinton White House about the language of the safe harbor 
produced a set of provisions that is both less precise and more complex than the safe harbor 
provisions contained in earlier reform bills. The full text of the “meaningful cautionary 
statements” prong provides that an issuer “shall not be liable with respect to any forward looking 
statement . . . if and to the extent that the forward-looking statement is identified as a forward-
looking statement, and is accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements identifying 
important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from those in the forward-
looking statement.”121 To this prong, the safe harbor adds two other provisions which protect an 
issuer from liability for an inaccurate forward-looking statement if the statement is “immaterial” 
or if the speaker who made the statement did not have “actual knowledge . . . that the statement 
was false or misleading.”122
121
 15 U.S.C. §78u-5(c)(1) (Supp. I 1995).
122 Id.  Subsection (c)(2) extends, with certain qualifications, the principles of subsection c(1) to oral 
forward looking statements.  Id. at §78u-5(c)(2) (Supp. I 1995).
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Referring to these and other provisions of the PSLRA, Professor John Coffee argued in 
1996 that, with its many “ambiguous gaps and statutory hiatuses,” the Reform Act was like “wet 
clay . . . shaped into an approximation of a human form” that would become either “high art” or
“competent mediocrity” in the hands of the courts.123 Unfortunately, the judiciary’s interpretive 
work to date with respect to the safe harbor provisions falls far short of high art.  The lower 
courts are no closer now to a uniform approach to evaluating liability for inaccurate forward-
looking statements than they were in 1997 when the first complaints implicating the PSLRA 
were filed.  In many cases, judges have attempted to interpret the language of the safe harbor 
provisions without reference to pre-PSLRA case law.124  Not surprisingly given the ambiguous 
nature of the statutory terms “important” and “meaningful,” this approach has produced 
inconsistent results.  When judges have instead looked to pre-PSLRA cases for guidance, they 
have failed to distinguish and separately evaluate the alternative interpretative frameworks
suggested by pre-PSLRA case law and regulatory materials.125 The course beyond the prevailing 
“competent mediocrity” in the case law regarding the safe harbor must begin with a clear 
articulation of the differences between these alternative frameworks and the selection of one as 
the starting point for all assessments of liability for inaccurate forward-looking information 
subject to the safe harbor.  By outlining the shortcomings of the materiality-based interpretation
of the “meaningful cautionary statements” safe harbor provision and demonstrating that an 
interpretation properly rooted in the traditional doctrinal framework resolves these defects, this 
123
 John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Or, Why the Fat Lady 
Has Not Yet Sung, 51 BUS. LAW. 975, 975 (1996).
124 See, e.g., Asher v. Baxter International, Inc., 377 F.3d 727 (2004); Miller v. Champion Enterprises, Inc., 
346 F.3d 660 (6th Cir., 2003); and Elhert v. Singer, 245 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2001).
125
 In many cases, courts have cited cases applying materiality-based approaches and falsity-based 
approaches together as if the cases conformed to a single analytical framework.  See, e.g., In re: Immune Response 
Securities Litigation, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12602, *117-128 (S.D. Cal. 2005); In re: Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc.,  2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1350, *42-55  (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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part argues that the traditional framework is the best available alternative for interpreting the 
PSLRA safe harbor.
As discussed in Part I, the most obvious problem with reading the first safe harbor 
provision as a formula for rendering predictive information immaterial is the inability of this 
approach to connect the provision to the safe harbor’s stated policy goal of enhancing allocative 
efficiency.126  A safe harbor that leads companies to increase disclosures of only immaterial 
information will have little impact on the accuracy of equity prices on which allocative 
efficiency depends.  The only response to this criticism is that some forward-looking information 
deemed immaterial under the Trump’s materiality framework will still influence investor 
decision-making.  This response, however, amounts to an acknowledgement that the framework
does not really filter forward-looking information according to its importance to investors or, in 
other words, that the Trump framework is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s definition of
materiality.  Of course, Congress has the power to replace the Court’s definition of materiality 
with a definition of its own.  Accordingly, this apparent defect of the Trump-based interpretation 
could be overlooked if other interpretive criteria suggested that the statutory language of the 
PSRLA safe harbor can only be interpreted as the outcome of a deliberate legislative effort to 
redefine materiality for purposes of forward-looking information.
Besides maintaining a logical relationship between policy objectives and statutory means, 
any proposed interpretation of the safe harbor ought to also satisfy at least the following three 
criteria: (1) because the provisions are disjunctive, the interpretations of the three safe harbor 
provisions taken together ought to ensure that each provision protects some set of forward-
126
 This criticism would apply with even greater force to an interpretation of the first provision that takes 
the provision as a codification of the Virginia Bankshares materiality analysis, under which, as discussed above, 
statements are only immaterial if they obviously discredit the predictive information.
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looking statements that the other two provisions do not (in other words, none of the three prongs 
should be rendered superfluous by the other two);127 (2) the interpretations of the three 
provisions taken together ought to provide acceptable guidance to managers; and (3) the 
interpretations taken together ought to be reasonable constructions of the statutory language.  
Although little effort is required to satisfy any two of these three criteria, simultaneously 
satisfying all three is more difficult than it may seem.  For example, one can easily satisfy the 
first and third criteria by interpreting the first safe harbor provision to immunize all predictions 
that are not intentionally misleading, the second - statements that are immaterial under current 
law, and the first - even intentionally misleading predictions accompanied by appropriate 
cautionary statements.  This set of interpretations fails to meet the second criterion, however, 
because it invites managers to intentionally deceive the investing public.  Similarly, one can 
easily satisfy the first two criteria by using the same interpretations for the second and third 
provisions but interpreting the first to immunize predictions accompanied by properly 
constructed cautionary statements unless the prediction itself was intentionally misleading.  
Because all statements immunized by the first provision are also immunized by the third 
127
 In his discussion of the safe harbor soon after the enactment of the PSLRA, Professor Coffee highlighted 
the challenge of finding independent significance for each of the provisions of the safe harbor as follows:  “Probably 
the most striking feature of the Reform Act’s safe harbor is the immunity it seems to give to a bald, knowing lie that 
is surrounded by ‘meaningful cautionary statements’ . . . .  Arguably, the [third] prong would add nothing and thus 
be superfluous if the first prong did not protect a false statement that was accompanied by ‘meaningful cautionary 
statements.’ As a matter of statutory interpretation, any reading of these two prongs that renders the [third] prong
superfluous must be avoided.”  John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Or, 
Why the Fat Lady Has Not Yet Sung, 51 BUS. LAW. 975, 981 (1996).   Although Coffee focuses on the danger that 
the third prong could be rendered superfluous, the larger obstacle is finding relational significance for the first 
prong.  A provision is not superfluous if it immunizes some portion of the set of statements that are clearly not 
immunized by either of the other two prongs.  The third prong will have such relational significance under almost 
any interpretation because by immunizing statements that the speaker did not actually know were false (regardless 
of the quality of the accompanying disclosures) the third prong clearly covers a portion of the set of statements that 
the first prong does not immunize (because they are either not accompanied by cautionary language or accompanied 
by cautionary language that is inadequate).  The second prong, of course, would also not immunize the statements so 
long as they were material.  Finding independent significance for the first prong is more difficult, however, because 
the only statements that the third prong appears to leave unprotected are statements that the speaker did actually 
know were false.
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provision under this set of interpretations, however, the interpretations render the first provision 
superfluous and thus fail to satisfy the relational significance criterion.
 Measured against the criteria of relational significance, reasonable construction, and 
market guidance, the Trump-based framework continues to fare poorly.  This framework would 
give the first prong significance in relation to the third provision because the first provision 
would immunize even a projection management actually knew was baseless so long as it was 
accompanied by disclosures tailored to the subject matter of the projection.  As in the first 
example above, however, the guidance implicit in this approach is perverse.  In any situation in 
which the interests of managers favored publishing misleading disclosures, they could do so 
without fear of liability so long as they could create content for accompanying statements that 
facially tied into the subject matter of the projection.  While this task may require more creativity 
than attaching boilerplate warnings to projections, the effort required would hardly deter 
executives bent on deceit from publishing misleading projections.128  For the same reason, a
Trump-based framework also fails to provide a reasonable construction of the statutory language 
of the first provision; accompanying disclosures that are tailored to a forward-looking statement 
yet fail to disclose contingencies management knows are more likely to cause a departure from 
projected results would hardly strike a person aware of the omissions as “meaningful.”
Moreover, the Trump-based interpretation does not fully satisfy the criterion of relational 
significance.  If the first provision offers a formula for rendering projections immaterial, all 
statements it immunizes are already immunized by the second provision.  In other words, 
although the interpretation clearly gives the first provision significance in relation to the third, it
128
 Whether the safe harbor under this interpretation would actually enhance market efficiency depends on 
whether the positive effects of the resulting increase in “true when made” projections would outweigh the negative 
effects of the increase in deliberately misleading projections caused by the safe harbor.
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fails to give the first provision significance in relation to the second.  Accordingly, if Congress’ 
intended for the “meaningful cautionary statements” language to serve as content for a new 
definition of materiality for purposes of forward-looking information, it should have passed a 
two-prong safe harbor comprised of the “immateriality” and “actual knowledge” prongs of the 
enacted safe harbor along with a separate provision defining “immaterial” statements to include 
statements “accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements identifying important factors that 
could cause actual results to differ materially from those in the forward-looking statement.”
A properly constructed interpretation of the safe harbor rooted in the traditional doctrinal 
framework avoids all of the defects to which the Trump-based interpretation is subject.  Under 
this interpretation, to demonstrate that a prediction falls outside the protection of the first safe 
harbor provision a plaintiff must show that a reasonable investor would have drawn important 
incorrect inferences from the publication of the prediction despite the disclosures in the 
accompanying statements.  If there are no important incorrect inferences that a reasonable 
investor would have drawn from the prediction in light of the accompanying disclosures, the 
disclosures should qualify as “meaningful cautionary statements.”  Accordingly, clearly material 
forward-looking information, the kind of information that is likely to enhance allocative 
efficiency, may be protected by the first safe harbor provision under this interpretation.129
129
 Under this interpretation, the omission of an important factor or even of the most important factor would 
not automatically render the remaining disclosures “meaningless,” particularly where disclosure of such information 
would substantially undermine the company’s competitive position.  On the other hand, an omission of one of the 
most important factors that can only be explained by management’s intent to mislead investors ought to render the 
remaining statements “meaningless.”  Moreover, while courts arguably must take into account Congress’ intent “not 
to provide an opportunity for plaintiffs’ counsel to conduct discovery on what was known to the issuer at the time 
the forward-looking statement was made,” courts’ application of the PSLRA’s heightened pleading standards ought 
to adequately ensure that plaintiffs have a clear idea of what the defendants knew and how they knew it before they 
are given access to discovery.  For example, where a plaintiff asserts that the cautionary statements accompanying a 
projection were not meaningful because an internal company report describes factors that were not contained in the 
cautionary statements accompanying the projection, but which were much more likely to affect actual results than 
the disclosed factors, a court could still dismiss the complaint under the pleading standards if the complaint does not 
identify “the sources of [the plaintiff’s] information with respect to the reports, how [the plaintiff] learned of the 
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In addition to being consistent with the underlying logic of the safe harbor, an
interpretation rooted in the traditional doctrinal framework clearly satisfies the acceptable 
guidance and reasonable construction criteria.  Interpreted in light of the traditional doctrinal 
framework, the first provision would encourage managers seeking the protection of the provision 
to disclose the information they believe will prevent reasonable investors from drawing incorrect 
inferences from the projection’s publication and defining the terms “meaningful” and 
“important” in terms of the propensity of the accompanying statements to prevent incorrect 
inferences that investors might otherwise draw from the publication of the prediction requires no 
stretching of these terms.130
With certain adjustments, the interpretation rooted in the traditional doctrinal framework
also satisfies the relational significance criterion.  Because, under this interpretation, 
accompanying statements render predictive statements “not misleading” rather than immaterial, 
the interpretation clearly gives the first provision significance in relation to the “immateriality” 
prong.  For the same reason, however, the traditional doctrinal framework could fail to give the 
first provision significance in relation to the third provision.  As the Virginia Bankshares opinion 
demonstrates, the traditional doctrinal framework yields the insight that a prediction can be false 
either because the inference that management believes in the prediction is incorrect (as “a 
misstatement of the psychological fact of the speaker’s belief in what he says”131) or because a 
reasonable inference about the likelihood or magnitude of a departure from the predicted results 
reports, who drafted them, or which officers received them.” In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 
985 (9th Cir. 1999).
130
 This approach also matches the following description by the Conference Committee of the intent of 
these statutory terms better than the Trump “tailoring” criterion:  “The cautionary statements must convey 
substantive information about factors that realistically could cause results to differ materially from those projected in 
the forward-looking statement, such as, for example, information about the issuer’s business.”  H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 
104-369, at 43 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 741.
131 Virginia Bankshares, Inc.  v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1095 (1991).
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is incorrect (because the prediction is “misleading about its subject matter.”)132  If one applies 
this view of falsity to the safe harbor, accompanying statements would fail to be “meaningful” 
for purposes of the safe harbor if they failed to prevent either kind of inference.  Accordingly, 
whenever the third provision was unavailable (because the speaker had actual knowledge that the 
statement was false) the first provision would necessarily be unavailable as well because the 
inference that the speaker actually believed the prediction could not be correct.
Fortunately, Virginia Bankshares also suggests a solution to this interpretive problem.  
Recognizing that, as a matter of theory, proof that a published opinion statement amounted to a 
“misstatement of the psychological fact of the speaker’s belief in what he says”133 should suffice 
for liability, the Virginia Bankshares Court decided against establishing this rule because “the 
temptation to rest an otherwise nonexistent . . . action on psychological enquiry alone would 
threaten . . . strike suits and attrition by discovery.”134  Incorporation of the same limitation into 
the falsity-based interpretation of the first safe harbor prong carves out a narrow set of statements 
that are protected by the first provision but not by the third, which is all that is necessary to 
satisfy the criterion of relational significance.135  If evidence adduced by a plaintiff demonstrates 
132 Id.  This is generally not true with respect to factual statements about the past.  If, for example, a 
manufacturing company manager attempted to defraud investors by failing to disclose product defects reported 
internally, his deceitful intent would not constitute fraud if the internal reports are incorrect and products are actually 
free of defects.  In the case of management’s opinions or predictions, however, investors must decide how much 
weight to give the statements and, as a result, seek to understand the depth of management’s belief in the opinions or 
predictions.
133 Id. at 1095.
134 Id. at 1096 (citing Stedman v. Storer, 308 F.Supp. 881, 887 (SDNY 1969) (dealing with § 10(b)).  Note 
that the two senses identified by the Court in which statements of opinion are factual mirror the good faith and 
reasonable basis elements of Rule 175.  By making both elements prerequisites to the protection of Rule 175, the 
SEC suggested that it would be possible for a plaintiff to prevent even reasonably based projections from coming 
within the safe harbor solely by showing that the speaker made them in bad faith.
135
 That the first prong would only immunize a small set of statements left unprotected by the third prong 
under this set of interpretations does not mean that reliance on the first prong would rarely make a difference in 
practice.  Managers at the same company often take different views of a company’s future.  Accordingly, whatever 
set of internal projections are ultimately disclosed by a company, they may frequently be inconsistent with the views 
of one or more managers at the company.  Particularized allegations of such inconsistencies might prevent a court 
from relying on the third provision to dismiss a complaint at the pleading stage.  The first provision, however, would 
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management’s belief that a prediction was false but fails to show that a reasonable investor 
would have drawn an important incorrect inference from the prediction’s publication, the first 
safe harbor provision will immunize the statement even though the third will not.
It is fair to question whether the incorporation of this limitation into the safe harbor 
interpretation does not give managers the same license to lie that, along with the other defects 
discussed above, makes the Trump-based interpretation unacceptable.  The basis for a negative 
response to this question lies in the overlap between falsity evidence and evidence of the 
defendant’s intent to mislead of scienter.  In the context of securities fraud litigation, there are 
two types of direct evidence of scienter: (1) internal memoranda, notes, emails, or other 
documents that record officers’ beliefs concerning the subject matter of public statements and (2)
a manager’s testimony regarding his own deceitful state of mind when the allegedly false 
statements were made.  Both types of evidence are rare and the latter is extremely rare.  
Accordingly, plaintiffs more commonly rely on indirect evidence of scienter.  That is, to prove 
scienter, plaintiffs argue that company officers knew or were reckless in failing to comprehend 
that public statements were false because internal facts to which they were exposed were 
inconsistent with their public statements.  In other words, such “indirect” evidence of scienter is 
simply direct evidence of falsity combined with evidence of personal exposure to that evidence .  
Because of this evidentiary overlap, in most cases where evidence adduced demonstrates 
management’s “actual knowledge” that a prediction was false, the same evidence will also 
demonstrate that statements accompanying the prediction were not “meaningful” because they 
failed to prevent important incorrect inferences a reasonable investor would have drawn about 
continue to offer protection so long as management had properly disclosed the key assumptions on which the 
prediction in question was based.
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the likelihood and extent of a departure of actual results from the predicted outcome. 136
Accordingly, as managers perpetrating a fraud through the use of baseless predictions leave a 
trail of “actual knowledge” evidence they will generally be unable to avoid creating evidence of 
the “meaninglessness” of the statements accompanying the predictions at the same time.
As discussed in Parts II and III, virtually all pre-1993 judicial and regulatory approaches 
to forward-looking information conformed to a single doctrinal framework.  Courts and 
commentators have failed to recognize this common underlying framework (and the sharp 
departure from the framework marked by Trump) largely because of the multiplication of 
vocabularies that refer to the framework’s basic concepts.  In other words, the use of the terms 
“good faith” and “reasonable basis” in some forward-looking information cases, “bespeaks 
caution” in others, and “subject matter” and “psychological facts” in still others has obscured the 
conformity of the inquiries entailed by the use of any of these terms to a single doctrinal 
framework.  Moreover, none of these terms clearly reveals the nature of the framework’s 
underlying analysis as first, an inquiry into the reasonableness and accuracy of unstated 
propositions or inferences in light of disclosures accompanying the predictive statement and, 
second, an inquiry into the importance of the inferences that the finder of fact finds reasonable 
and inaccurate.  Accordingly, by incorporating the content of these inquiries into a rule defining 
136
 The Virginia Bankshares Court found that this limitation would not substantially restrict liability for 
misleading statements of belief for essentially the same reasons: “[I]t would be rare to find a case with evidence 
solely of disbelief or undisclosed motivation without further proof that the statement was defective as to its subject 
matter. While we certainly would not hold a director’s naked admission of disbelief incompetent evidence of a 
proxy statement’s false or misleading character, such an unusual admission will not very often stand alone, and we 
do not substantially narrow the cause of action by requiring a plaintiff to demonstrate something false or misleading 
in what the statement expressly or impliedly declared about its subject.” Virginia Bankshares v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 
1083, 1096 (1991).  Note, however, that the interpretation of the safe harbor provisions rooted in the traditional 
doctrinal framework must go beyond codification of the Virginia Bankshares falsity analysis.  Virginia Bankshares
apparently permits liability based on evidence that a statement “was false or misleading about its subject” in the 
absence of evidence that the statements also represented a “misstatement of the psychological fact of the speaker’s 
belief in what he says.”  Because the safe harbor’s provisions are disjunctive, the provisions should foreclose this 
possibility with respect to covered forward-looking information.
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the PSLRA safe harbor statutory term “meaningful,” the Commission could eliminate the 
confusion caused by the proliferation of materiality-based analyses of forward-looking 
information following Trump and also force courts prepared to dismiss cases based on allegedly 
misleading predictions to state explicitly that each of the incorrect inferences allegedly drawn by 
the plaintiff from the prediction was either unreasonable or reasonable but immaterial.  
Intervention by the Supreme Court in the right case could similarly rule out materiality-based 
interpretations of the first safe harbor provision and precisely describe the inquiries that should 
flow from a safe harbor interpretation rooted in the traditional framework.  In either case, lower 
courts, in turn, could generally require plaintiffs to allege with particularity the incorrect 
inferences they drew at the time the prediction was made and why those inferences were 
reasonable despite the accompanying disclosures.  Finally, an authoritative regulatory or judicial 
definition of the statutory term “meaningful” would also provide standards to which courts could 
look in cases involving predictive information that is not covered by the PSLRA safe harbor,137
though such courts would be free from interpretive constraints posed by the language and 
disjunctive structure of the safe harbor.138
137
  Subsection (a) of the PSLRA safe harbor limits the applicability of the safe harbor to public companies 
and certain persons acting on their behalf.  15 U.S.C. §78u-5(a) (Supp. I 1995).  Subsection (b) further limits the 
applicability of the safe harbor by excluding statements made in certain circumstances, such as initial public 
offerings, or by certain persons, such as felons convicted in the three years prior to the statement.  Id. at §78u-5(b). 
138
  For example, courts evaluating forward-looking information not covered by the safe harbor could 
permit culpability less than “actual knowledge” to suffice for scienter.
